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CHAPTER I
Introduction: Theme, Objectives,
and Structure

1Introduction: Theme, Objectives, and Structure
The first theorem of welfare states that under perfect market conditions any econ-
omy should achieve allocative and productive efficiency, also known as Pareto efficiency
(Pareto, 1897). Under Pareto efficiency, no one can be made better off without making
someone else worse off and the government only needs to engage in some initial redis-
tributions through lump-sum transfers. However, the Greenwald-Stiglitz theorem states
that the conditions for Pareto efficiency seldom exist. Market failures occur almost ev-
erywhere, suggesting that the government could improve welfare by resource allocation
and efficiency gains (Stiglitz, 1991).
So far, government interventions have typically been limited to resource allocation,
ignoring the potential for efficiency gains. As the debt crises of the United States and
Europe demonstrate, this does not necessarily increase welfare. In contrast, welfare could
even decrease if resource allocation creates incentive to waste public resources. Yet, since
demographic changes and globalization efforts continue to limit the public resources in
many developed countries, production efficiency must be addressed.
This dissertation focuses on efficiency measurements and discusses four topics where
government interventions could cause incentive for market inefficiencies. The countries
analyzed are Switzerland and the United States. In all chapters, advanced non-parametric
and parametric efficiency measurement approaches are applied to deal with several im-
portant issues, such as the relevance of unobserved heterogeneity and uncertainty in
production inputs and outputs.
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Chapter 2 focuses on the efficiency of public good provision in Switzerland. From
a theoretical point of view, Tiebout competition should induce Swiss member states
(cantons) to use tax revenue efficiently (Tiebout, 1956). However, this requires that there
are no externalities and that differences in performance are due entirely to the efficiency
of administration. Since disparities must be mitigated in order to create a level playing
field, Switzerland has applied a fiscal equalization scheme that enables poor cantons to
produce public goods at average tax rates. However, despite the aspiration for equity
gains, fiscal equalization can increase disparities if cantons on the receiving end lack
incentives for efficiency, commonly known as the “flypaper effect” (Inman, 2008). The
efficiency of contributing cantons may be undermined as well, giving rise to an equity-
efficiency trade-off (Stiglitz, 1988).
This chapter includes an investigation of whether fiscal equalization among Swiss can-
tons reduces the incentive for efficiency. The efficiency of all 26 Swiss cantons is measured
between 2000 and 2004. Aggregate output performance indicators, including six major
public services, are constructed to calculate cantonal efficiency scores based on robust
data envelopment analysis. Efficiency scores are then related to the fiscal equalization
scheme operated by the Swiss federal state, controlling for the socioeconomic factors that
also influence cantonal performance.
Chapter 3 and 4 provide an empirical analysis of the efficiency of Swiss hospitals. As
in many other developed countries, increasing health care expenditures have highlighted
the importance of health care reforms that pursue efficiency gains. One such reform in-
cludes transitioning to a prospective payment system. The assumption is that a change to
predetermined and fixed payments places hospitals at operating risk and increases their
cost efficiency (e.g., Biorn et al., 2003, Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998, and Newhouse,
1996). However, the challenge for policy makers is how to reward efficiency, which involves
identifying the differences caused by inefficiency instead of by heterogeneity due to exoge-
nous influences. If regulators enforce the cost reductions indicated by simple performance
measures, such as operating cost per casemix-adjusted patient case, highly efficient hos-
pitals could end up in financial distress. Chapter 3 includes an empirical analysis of the
importance of heterogeneity in the measurement of Swiss hospital efficiency. Particularly
in federalist countries such as Switzerland, where hospitals operate in different regulatory
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environments and provide health care services using different technologies, heterogeneity
may significantly influence the cost variability among hospitals. In Chapter 3, stochastic
frontier analysis is applied to a standard, random intercept, and random parameter fron-
tier model in order to account for heterogeneity in the production technology. Estimates
are derived from a variable cost function for approximately 100 Swiss hospitals for the
years 2004 to 2007.
Since it is difficult to account for heterogeneity when estimating hospital cost efficiency,
the question remains whether prospective payment systems can contain hospital costs.
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to analyze the influence of prospective payment systems
on Swiss hospital efficiency. The analysis provides a comparison of a retrospective per
diem payment system with a prospective global budget and a payment per patient case
system. Again, this chapter includes a stochastic frontier analysis using a standard and a
random parameter frontier model to account for the existence of heterogeneity. Estimates
are derived using a variable cost function for approximately 90 subsidized Swiss hospitals
for the years 2004 to 2009.
An analysis of the relevance of efficiency measurement in the provision of electricity
is presented in Chapter 5. Stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis are
the two most prevalent approaches for the measurement of efficiency (see Chapter 2 to
4). However, they are only suitable when productive units are homogenous with regard
to technology (relaxed in Chapter 3 and 4) and have stable input prices, and hence little
uncertainty. In the provision of electricity, both of these assumptions are not satisfied.
In particular, each power plant utilizes a different type of technology depending on its
primary energy source (e.g., coal, nuclear, wind) and is exposed to different exogenous
shocks (e.g., the Gulf war in the case of oil). Exogenous shocks cause unexpected changes
in input prices that affect the level and development of the efficient frontier. Therefore,
it is not sufficient to focus on the lowest cost provision of electricity. A risk-adjusted
efficiency measurement that involves the optimal mix of technology provides a more
reliable measurement. In Chapter 5, portfolio theory is applied to estimate the efficiency of
electricity provision in the United States and Switzerland. Seemingly unrelated regression
estimation (SURE) is adopted for estimating the covariance matrix used in determining
the efficient frontier.
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Chapter 6 concludes by stating the major policy implications and disclosing possible
future extensions.
Note that Prof. Dr. Peter Zweifel co-authored Chapters 2, 3 and 5, Prof. Dr. Mehdi
Farsi co-authored Chapter 3, and Dr. Boris Krey co-authored Chapter 5. Chapter 2 is
forthcoming in Public Finance Review. Chapter 3 has been submitted to the Journal of
Productivity Analysis. Chapter 4 has been submitted to Health Economics, and Chapter 5
has been submitted to Energy Policy.
This introduction concludes with a note concerning the structure of this dissertation.
Each chapter of this dissertation can be considered as self-contained, having its own
appendix. Institutional features are explained separately in each chapter in the interest
of readability. References across chapters are made explicit.
CHAPTER II
Fiscal Equalization, Tiebout Competition,
and Incentives for Efficiency
in a Federalist Country
Philippe K. Widmer and Peter Zweifel

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it measures the efficiency
in the provision of public goods by local jurisdictions applying Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA). Second, it relates efficiency scores to a fiscal equalization scheme
designed to mitigate the negative consequences of Tiebout competition. The data come
from the 26 cantons of Switzerland (2000-2004), a country characterized by marked
federalism. Results show the equalization scheme to indeed have a negative influence
on performance, resulting in an efficiency-equity trade-off (Stiglitz, 1988). However,
substitution of earmarked payments by lump-sum payments as part of the 2008 reform
is likely to enhance cantonal performance.
Keywords: DEA, efficiency measurement, federalism, fiscal equalization, public finance,
Switzerland, Tiebout competition
JEL classification: C14; C67; H11; H72; H83

2Fiscal Equalization, Tiebout Competition, and
Incentives for Efficiency in a Federalist Country
2.1 Introduction
During the past decade, growing tax burdens have combined with ecological and equity
concerns to increase citizens’ interest in the efficient provision of public goods. Economists
have been responding to this interest by trying to provide information about government
performance that may contribute to an efficient use of tax revenues. Examples of efficiency
measurement of public services include Drake and Simper (2003), who examined police
departments in England and Welsh, Worthington and Dollery (2001), who estimated the
efficiency of waste management in South Wales and Worthington (2001), who focused
on U.S. and English public education. Grossman et al. (1999) conclude that competition
between U.S. cities serves to increase their efficiency, in line with the Tiebout hypothesis.
As to continental Europe, Afonso and Fernandes (2006); Afonso and Scaglioni (2005);
De Borger and Kerstens (1996) as well as Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993) examined the
efficiency of Lisbon, Italian, and Belgian local governments, respectively. Specifically,
De Borger and Kerstens (1996) find that the tax rate and income per capita have an
insignificant effect on the performance of Belgian local governments, while federal grants
have a negative influence. At the country level, Afonso et al. (2006), comparing new EU
member and emerging market states, conclude that trade openness and transparency in
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government have a positive but insignificant effect on efficiency, while public trust in
politicians fosters inefficiency.
These studies have not taken into account one feature of federalist countries that may
affect efficiency at the local level, viz. fiscal equalization schemes. Fiscal equalization
is designed to reduce horizontal and vertical fiscal imbalances that often exist between
lower-level jurisdictions to provide public goods. This reduction is achieved by payments
from jurisdictions with above-average fiscal capacity to jurisdictions with below-average
fiscal capacity. In this way below-average jurisdictions are to be enabled to produce public
goods at average tax rates (Tho¨ny, 2005). Equalization schemes exist in most countries,
among them the United States, the European Union, Germany, Austria, and Switzerland
– sometimes even at the community level. However, little attention has been given to
the influence of such programs on the performance of both contributing and receiving
member states. Indeed, disparities in the provision of public goods could even increase
because jurisdictions on the receiving end may lack incentives for efficiency,commonly
known as the “flypaper effect” (Inman, 2008). The efficiency of contributing states may be
undermined, too, giving rise to the well-documented equity-efficiency trade-off (Stiglitz,
1988).
The contribution of this paper therefore is twofold. First, it measures the efficiency of
all 26 Swiss cantons between 2000 and 2004. Aggregate output performance indicators
including six major public services are constructed to calculate cantonal efficiency scores
based on robust Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Second, calculated efficiency scores
are related to the fiscal equalization scheme operated by the Swiss federal state both in
its present and its new (allegedly improved) form, controlling for socioeconomic factors
that also have an influence on cantonal performance.
To the best knowledge of the authors, this is the first contribution undertaking a
macroeconomic efficiency measurement of public good provision in a federalist country
that takes the incentive effects of a fiscal equalization scheme into account.
This paper is organized as follows. The second section provides some background
information about Swiss federalism. The third section contains a review of efficiency
measurement methods to argue that DEA is the method of choice in the present context.
The data used are described in the fourth section. The fifth section is devoted to the
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presentation of results of the DEA and of a Tobit model estimating the effect of the
fiscal equalization scheme on DEA efficiency scores. The final section concludes with an
outlook and suggestions for future research.
2.2 Swiss Federalism
2.2.1 Cantons as the Producers of Public Goods
Switzerland, a federal state with its constitution dating from 1848, distinguishes between
three levels of government, viz. federal, 26 cantons1, and approximately 2,600 commu-
nities. Public services are financed and provided at all three levels, but with differing
authorities. While the communities act under cantonal oversight, the cantons still consti-
tute the backbone of the state. By article 3 of the Swiss constitution, they are responsible
for all public services that are delegated neither to the federal state nor to their affiliated
local authorities. Cantons are sovereign governmental entities with their own constitution
and separation of power (legislative, executive, and judiciary), resulting in an extremely
decentralized provision of public services.
Table 2.1 shows public expenditure on the 12 major service categories according to
the three levels of authority. To the extent that Olson’s (1969) equivalence principle
applies, expenditure by an authority also means provision. According to that principle,
more than 60 percent of public good provision are estimated to be controlled by the 26
cantons and their affiliated communities. However, this share varies between categories;
it is particularly low for military defense and foreign relations, which are delegated to
the federal state. It is highest in education and health, which also constitute two of the
most important overall expenditure items.
The Tiebout (1956) hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between fiscal federal-
ism and performance of government. Similar to a free market economy, where consumers
buy from the producer offering the best performance-price ratio, citizens choose the juris-
1 The 26 Swiss cantons are Appenzell Inner-Rhodes (AI), Appenzell Outer-Rhodes (AR), Argovia
(AG), Basel-City (BS), Basel-Country (BL), Bern (BE), Fribourg (FR), Geneva (GE), Glarus
(GL), Grisons (GR), Jura (JU), Lucerne (LU), Neuchatel (NE), Nidwalden (NW), Obwalden (OW),
Schaffhausen (SH), Schwyz (SZ), Solothurn (SO), St.Gall (SG), Thurgovia (TG), Ticino (TI), Uri
(UR), Valais (VS), Vaud (VD), Zug (ZG), and Zurich (ZH).
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Table 2.1: Functional Structure of Public Good Provision, Year 2004
Expenditure Federal state Cantons Communities Total
In CHF Million
(1) Administration 1,918 3,299 3,637 8,855
(2) Public safety 728 5,287 1,955 7,970
(3) [Military defense] 4,637 157 185 4,979
(4) [Foreign relations] 2,427 - - 2,427
(5) Education 5,231 14,399 8,055 27’684
(6) Culture & Sport 447 1,380 2,422 4,249
(7) Health 200 12,203 6,922 19,326
(8) [Social welfare] 13,805 8,026 5,911 27,742
(9) Transportation 8,547 2,873 2,991 14,411
(10) Environment &
Spatial planning
728 1,019 3,159 4,907
(11) Public economy 4,546 1,287 512 6,344
(12) [Finance & Tax] 9,411 -984 1,059 9,486
Total expenditure 52,624 48,947 36,808 138,379
Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 1 CHF = 0.8 USD (2004 exchange rates).
diction where they get the best ratio between public services provided and tax paid. In the
case of Switzerland, cantonal autonomy in combination with direct democratic control
through popular initiatives and referenda have resulted in considerable heterogeneity in
the mode of provision. Since citizens can migrate and shift capital freely between cantons,
they indeed expose them to Tiebout competition.
However, this hypothesis assumes that there are no externalities and that differences
in performance are entirely due to the efficiency of administration. Externalities (spillover
effects) exist if citizens from one canton cannot be prevented from using services provided
by another canton without paying. They typically arise in health care, education, and
culture, although cantons with specialized hospitals do charge higher fees to patients
from elsewhere, those with a university levy higher tuitions, and those with an opera
house often make other cantons contribute to their operating expense. As to the effi-
ciency of administration, there are disparities that are due to topographic, demographic,
and socioeconomic conditions, constituting a handicap that cannot be overcome by the
affected canton. Both confounding influences will be controlled for (see Section 2.4.1
and 2.4.4, respectively) when assessing the influence of Tiebout competition on cantonal
performance.
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2.2.2 Existing Fiscal Equalization Scheme
To overcome these disadvantages of fiscal federalism, Switzerland initiated a fiscal equal-
ization program in 1959 to equalize cantonal disparities in the provision of public goods.
According to an amendment of the federal constitution (article 135), cantonal disparities
are to be mitigated with reference to Tiebout competition, the objective is to create a
level playing field. By 2004, fiscal equalization has grown to some 1,000 CHF mn. of
payments from the confederation to the cantons and another 1,500 CHF mn. between
them. In relative terms, it totals almost 3 percent of cantonal and communal expenditure.
The program is geared to the ’financial potential’ indicator, which has four components.
Financial potential is defined to increase with
(1) Income: Cantonal income per capita;
(2) Tax power: Taxable income, weighted by the tax burden per capita;
(3) Inverse of tax burden: Cantonal plus communal taxation as a share of Income;
(4) Favorable topographic situation: Share of a canton’s non-mountainous cropland in
its total area, weighted by the number of inhabitants per unit of productive land.
Figure 2.1: Payments of the Swiss Fiscal Equalization Program (2004)a)
Source: Federal Finance Administration (FFA)
a)For the acronyms, see footnote No. 1.
A higher total index value results in less financial assistance. Figure 2.1 shows total
payments per capita as of 2004. The canton of Zug contributed the maximum of some
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CHF 1,250 (1 CHF = 0.8 USD in 2004) per capita to the program, followed by Basel-
City, Geneva, and Zurich. At the other extreme, the 33,000 inhabitants of the canton of
Obwalden in central Switzerland received some CHF 1,800 on average. In comparison,
the extreme values of the German equalization scheme are a maximum of some CHF 600
paid by the land of Hessen and a maximum of some CHF 1,200 CHF per capita received
by Berlin. These figures illustrate the importance of the Swiss fiscal equalization scheme.
One also needs to distinguish between earmarked (almost 70 percent of total) and
general payments. While general payments can be used by the canton in ways it believes
to generate the highest benefit for its citizens, earmarked subsidies may result in gold
plating of projects and hence inefficiency (see e.g. De Borger and Kerstens, 1996).
Wrong incentives of the fiscal equalization program could have a sizable influence
on cantonal performance and national welfare. Indeed, the existing program has been
suspected of inducing the disparities it is designed to alleviate. Especially components
No. 2 and 3 of the index formula are seen to create incentives for subsidized cantons to
keep their tax burden high, e.g. by using their tax revenue for projects that contribute
little to economic growth but enhance politicians’ popularity (Fischer et al., 2003). In
addition, cantons that are obliged to pay into the scheme have incentives to waste their
money as well. They rather spend it on idle projects than give it to other cantons. These
concerns have resulted in a reform proposal that passed a popular referendum in 2006.
Starting in 2008, the share of earmarked payments was to be reduced to a minimum.
Equalization payments are to be governed by a new formula, which distinguishes between
resource and financial disparities. Against this backdrop, this paper seeks to answer two
questions:
(1) Does a fiscal equalization program as sizable as the Swiss contain incentives to pro-
vide public goods less efficiently, creating a trade-off between equity and efficiency?
(2) Does it matter whether transfer payments are earmarked or not?
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2.3 Measuring Technical Efficiency with Data Envel-
opment Analysis
The characterization of Swiss cantons in the preceding section justifies viewing them as
largely independent producers of a subset of public goods. For productivity measurement,
they constitute decision making units (DMU) that transform inputs into outputs, with
productivity reflecting the quality of their administration. Following Koopmans (1951),
technical efficiency in the provision of public goods thus can be measured with reference
to a technology set Γ,
Γ = {(X, Y )| Y ≤ f(X)} (2.1)
that describes the feasible set of input and output combinations (X, Y ) of a production
process. A DMU is called technically efficient if it lies on the boundary of Γ. On that
boundary, it is not possible to produce more outputs Y for a given amount of inputs X¯;
or conversely, no smaller quantity of inputs X can produce a given output Y¯ .
There are various assumptions regarding the boundary of Γ. For simplicity we adopt
those of Shephard (1970),
Iso X(y) = {x| x ∈ X(y), θx 6∈ X(y),∀ 0 < θ < 1}
Iso Y (x) = {y| y ∈ Y (x), θ−1y 6∈ Y (x),∀ 0 < θ < 1}. (2.2)
Here, the input and output isoquants Iso (·) define sections with strong and weak tech-
nical efficiency, depending on the slope of the frontier, with θ denoting a scalar by which
all inputs can be reduced without leaving the feasibility set. Accordingly, θ−1 symbol-
izes the scaling-up factor for the outputs. However, the relevant technology set is almost
never known in applied economic research, forcing the analyst to use observed rather
than efficient input and output quantities. The pertinent methodology was developed
by Farrell (1957); it has evolved into a distinction between parametric (econometric) and
non-parametric (mathematical) methods (see Coelli et al., 2005 for respective overviews).
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In public good provision analysis, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is the most com-
mon alternative. Webster et. al (1998) argue that DEA dominates its main competitor,
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) because of the following reasons:
• DEA is more flexible because no specific functional form of the transformation
process needs to be specified;
• DEA does not have to rely on price data for inputs and outputs, which often is
lacking in the public sector.
DEA is the preferred technique for the present investigation, in particular because of
lacking information about factor prices. Public sector accounts are notorious for neglect-
ing capital user cost, and Switzerland is no exception. The DEA version employed here is
an input-orientated one. The objective is to determine an efficient frontier ̂IsoX(y) that
is defined by the most productive DMUs. DEA amounts to solving a linear optimization
problem for a particular DMUc or canton c = 1, ..., 26, with an 1 ×K output vector yc
and a 1×M input vector xc,
Maxυ,ν υ
′yc
s.t. ν ′xc = 1
υ′Y − ν ′X ≤ 0
υ, ν ≥ 0. (2.3)
Here, the 26×K output matrix Y and 26×M input matrix X represent the data for
all 26 cantons. Thus, let a canton optimize its outputs yc and inputs xc by maximizing
the distance between them valued using weights υ and ν. Note that these weights relate
to the universe of all cantons and can be interpreted as shadow prices. Moreover, inputs
are normalized to sum up (after weighting) to 1. The inequality υ′Y − ν ′X ≤ 0 prevents
outputs from increasing without bounds for a given bundle of inputs. ̂IsoX(y) is defined
by those units for which υ′Y −ν ′X = 0. Their efficiency score ÊFFc is 100 percent, while
that of the other DMUs is given by their radial distance from the frontier.
However, the location of the efficient frontier strongly depends on the extreme DMUs
(which lack comparators). One way to obtain robust DEA efficiency scores ÊFF is to
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iteratively exclude one DMU lying on the efficiency frontier. The new frontier then assigns
this DMU a so-called super-efficiency score in excess of 100 percent without truncating
the scores of the remaining DMUs (Andersen and Petersen, 1993). The larger the super-
efficiency of a DMU, the farther away it is from the remaining units in the technology
set. Here, if this score is more than 1.5 times the distance between the 25th and the
75th percentile of all super-efficiency values, the pertinent DMU is excluded as an outlier
(Thanssoulis, 1999).
In a second step, the obtained robust efficiency scores ÊFFct (of cantons c = 1, ..., 26
in year t = 2000, ..., 2004) are related to a set of variables characterizing the Swiss fiscal
equalization program and the disparities between cantons in order to address the two
research questions stated at the end of Section 2.2,
ÊFFct = γ0 + γ1Z1,ct + γ2Z2,ct + ...+ γnZn,ct + ϕct. (2.4)
Commonly, Tobit estimation is applied to account for the fact that scores cannot
exceed 1.00 (the lower limit of 0 is less relevant because it is never binding). Specification
details are given in Section 2.5.2 below. Alternatively, one could also use the super-
efficiency scores of the outlier detection process as dependent variable and estimate OLS.
However, to be consistent with the theoretical background of Farrell (1957) and because
the two variants lead to similar conclusions, we proceed with the more common robust
efficiency scores as the dependent variable (see De Borger and Kerstens, 1996 and Drake
and Simper, 2003 for applications of Tobit estimates).
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Service Categories Retained
The data come from the Federal Statistical Office, covering the years 2000 to 2004. As
shown in Table 2.1, not all categories of services listed are predominantly subject to can-
tonal control. Moreover, the quality of data is insufficient for some categories. Therefore,
only six out of twelve are retained for this investigation, viz. (1) administration, (2) public
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safety, (5) education, (7) health, (9) transportation and (11) public economy (they will be
renumbered 1 to 6 below). Further, in order to exclude spillovers as far as possible, only
primary and secondary education (without tertiary and vocational components), private
road transportation (without regional public transportation) and farming and forestry
are included in the the analysis. More refined adjustments for spillovers (known to exist
especially in health care) were not possible. They are controlled for in the second step
Tobit estimation.
2.4.2 Constructing an Aggregate Output Performance Index
Section 2.3 makes clear that the choice of output variables has an important influence on
the results of a DEA. However, in public good provision, choice is no simple task because
of two reasons. First, most of the outputs are not directly quantifiable. Second, public
services are too many for individually entering them in a DEA. In this paper, we try
to overcome these difficulties by running a cost driver analysis and by constructing an
aggregate output performance index.
Selecting the Output Variables
Since outputs of the public sector are difficult to measure, activity-based indicators serve
as a substitute, in line with previous studies (see e.g. Afonso et al., 2006). In this paper,
two to six indicators for each of the six retained categories – 22 in total – are selected to
proxy the output of public goods provided by a canton (see Table 2.2).
Our selection was based on two concerns: choosing the most relevant variables and
making sure that they cover the years 2000-2004 for each canton. The relevance of the
selected variables is checked with an analysis of cost drivers in the six service categories.
Thus, the dependent variables are category-specific real expenditure Cjct, (j = 1, ..., 6) of
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Table 2.2: Output Indicators for the Six Governmental Activities Investigated
Public Service Output Description, remarks
(1) Administration
Legislative, Executive Y1 Population Population served and number of firms serve
as proxies for administration services
provided.
General administration Y2 No. firms
(2) Public safety
Judicature Y1 No. delinquencies The assumption is that all citizens and
dwelling units have the same preferences for
public safety and a similar probability of
suffering from crime and fire risk.
Police Y2 Population
Fire department Y3 No. dwelling units
(3) Education
Kindergarden Y1 No. students The numbers of kindergarten, primary,
secondary, and high school students serve as
indicators of output values.
Primary education Y2 No. students
Secondary education Y3 No. students
High school education Y4 No. students
(4) Health
Hospitals (specialized) Y1 No. patient cases Case-mix adjusted number of cases serve as a
severity adjusted output for specialized and
primary hospitals. The output of
rehabilitation and psychiatric clinics, nursing
homes and retirement homes is measured by
the number of patient days.
Hospitals (primary) Y2 No. patient cases
Hospitals (psychiatric) Y3 No. patient days
Rehab clinic Y4 No. patient days
Nursing homes Y5 No. patient days
Retirement homes Y6 No. patient days
(5) Transportation
Cantonal roads Y1 Road length (km) Road length serves as a proxy for
maintenance. Number of cars is used as a
utilization indicator for the roads.
Communal roads Y2 Road length (km)
Road utilization Y3 No. cars
(6) Public economy
Farming Y1 Farming area (km2) The assumption is that farming and Forest
areas serve recreation purposes. The share of
mountain area and organic farming area
adjusts for differences in quality.
Y2 Mountain area (km2)
Y3 Organic area (km2)
Forestry Y4 Forest area (km2)
canton c, (c = 1, ..., 26) in year t, (t = 2000, ..., 2004). They are related to the output
indicators (Y jk,ct, k = 1, ..., Kj for 2 ≤ Kj ≤ 6) and a time trend (trendjt , t = 1, ..., 5),
C1ct = β
1
0 + β
1
1Y
1
1,ct + β
1
2Y
1
2,ct + · · ·+ β1K1Y 1K1,ct + α1trend1t + ε1ct
...
C6ct = β
6
0 + β
6
1Y
6
1,ct + β
6
2Y
6
2,ct + · · ·+ β6K6Y 6K6,ct + α6trend6t + ε6ct. (2.5)
Since cantons are exposed to similar shocks, error terms εjit are likely to be correlated,
calling for SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation).
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Depending on the service category, SURE confirms the relevance of the selected 22 out-
put indicators and the correlation between the service categories. Pertinent econometric
results are shown in Table 2.3 together with the correlation matrix of the residuals. Two
criteria were applied to judge the relevance of the output indicators. First, they need to
be positively related to cost as a summary measure of input qualities, in keeping with the
production theory laid out in Section 2.3. Second, they should importantly contribute to
the explanatory power of the cost driver analysis, indicated by the significance level of
their coefficients.
Table 2.3: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results for Six Public Service Categoriesa)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Y1 9.74E+04*** -7.18E+04** 1.25E+08*** 1.61E+05*** 3.17E+04*** 2.50E+00***
2.04E+04 2.22E+04 1.91E+07 2.42E+04 4.83E+03 9.33E+02
Y2 1.55E+05*** 1.76E+05*** 2.19E+08*** 3.07E+05*** 2.17E+04*** 7.80E+03***
2.14E+04 5.19E+04 1.35E+07 2.26E+04 5.85E+03 1.82E+03
Y3 - 1.69E+05** 5.79E+07*** 4.78E+04*** 6.17E-01*** 1.29E+04***
5.49E+04 1.28E+07 9.75E+03 3.10E+03 2.56E+03
Y4 - - 7.06E+07*** 3.98E+03 - 1.67E+04***
1.16E+07 1.08E+04 1.88E+03
Y5 - - - 1.08E+05** -
3.93E+04
Y6 - - - 2.38E+04 - -
1.72E+04
adj. R2 0.94 0.91 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.99
Obs. 130 130 130 130 130 130
Correlation Matrix of the Residuals
(1) 1.00 0.20 0.03 0.37 -0.17 0.03
(2) 1.00 0.81 0.46 0.48 0.09
(3) 1.00 0.41 0.53 0.05
(4) 1.00 0.09 -0.15
(5) 1.00 0.17
(6) 1.00
(1) Administration, (2) Public safety, (3) Education, (4) Health, (5) Transportation, (6) Public economy.
a) standard errors in parentheses, time dummies not shown.
**,*** Significant at the 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively.
With one exception, the output indicators are positively related to cost. The negative
sign of β21 in Table 2.3 (number of delinquencies) could be the result of systematic mea-
surement error. Some cantons report the many petty of cases (which cause little expense),
while others limit their reporting to the relatively few major offenses (which cost a lot).
These differences may induce a negative partial correlation between expenditure on pub-
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lic safety and the number of delinquencies. Furthermore, except for the two coefficients β44
(rehab clinics) and β46 (retirement homes), all indicators are significant at the 95 percent
confidence level. Both indicators are nevertheless retained for reasons of completeness.
Finally, the adjusted R2 reaches at least 90 percent, confirming the combined relevance
of the selected indicators.
The Output Performance Index
Including all 22 indicators is still not possible in an annual DEA with 26 cantons. This is
because DEA necessarily identifies at least one canton as efficient w.r.t. the 22 output-
cost combinations. Thus, at least 22 out of 26 cantons would be identified as efficient,
reducing the power of the analysis. One possibility is to aggregate the retained 22 output
indicators Y jk,ct to a performance index Ψ
j
ct for each service category (j = 1, .., 6), resulting
in
Ψjct =
Kj∑
k=1
Y jk,ct ∗ pjk. (2.6)
In this calculation, the problematic output indicator delinquencies is subjected to a
linear monotone transformation such that Ŷ 21,ct = −Y 21,ct + r ≥ 0 (see Seiford and Zhu,
2002). As to the weighting parameters pjk pertaining to the two to six output indicators
per service category, there are two alternatives. One is to use the estimated βjk from eqs.
(2.5). Here, all cantons get the same weighting parameters pjk. A more flexible variant
is to use the canton-specific shadow prices υc from a DEA applied to each of the six
service categories (see Section 2.3 again). These shadow prices reflect the marginal cost
of expanding a particular service by one unit produced by an efficient DMU. For the
inefficient DMUs, a radial projection onto the efficiency frontier permits to determine
the pertinent shadow prices. In this variant, no canton is discriminated because of an
inappropriate weighting parameter pjk would be the case in the first alternative. For each
canton, the aggregation is based on those cantonal specific weighting parameters υc, which
maximize their output performance index. For reasons of consistency, this alternative is
retained for our analysis. The results of this calculation (with Ψjc values for 2004) are
displayed in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.4: Output Performance Indicators Ψji , 26 Swiss Cantons (2004)
Cantons (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ZH 804,351 609,182 1,438,309 2,414,338 293,337 182,691
BE 608,731 467,307 1,018,589 2,279,872 270,257 535,600
LU 226,021 160,632 534,219 490,410 84,259 187,310
UR 22,354 16,503 49,531 39,184 12,713 26,513
SZ 87,616 61,522 175,165 128,367 37,009 73,474
OW 21,130 17,194 46,818 33,907 11,161 34,362
NW 28,856 17,994 48,612 35,418 10,613 20,764
GL 25,754 19,353 51,962 61,451 10,999 29,547
ZG 128,873 47,613 134,137 132,750 27,843 31,162
FR 160,165 113,271 363,600 343,419 75,380 180,878
SO 157,621 112,625 312,784 269,547 65,085 85,709
BS 123,028 104,393 232,726 634,082 31,674 1,302
BL 169,043 120,690 383,400 317,776 62,031 58,940
SH 47,015 34,727 96,062 113,555 31,302 36,222
AR 33,668 24,723 74,755 99,397 17,765 43,370
AI 10,082 7,635 29,755 15,113 4,366 24,714
SG 292,344 208,803 620,278 668,789 108,448 205,445
GR 120,802 130,689 221,249 300,494 97,956 306,163
AG 360,075 255,663 858,094 691,775 145,986 146,288
TG 148,445 105,537 332,003 360,721 71,424 117,408
TI 220,732 185,993 420,807 654,548 100,196 84,566
VD 413,159 327,087 986,906 1,411,360 188,657 274,138
VS 183,488 174,242 399,383 459,095 134,423 138,802
NE 106,986 80,628 270,524 284,766 44,079 91,707
GE 288,564 204,038 635,494 1,508,138 106,019 24,811
JU 44,022 31,404 95,142 121,188 29,632 106,580
(1) Administration, (2) Public safety, (3) Education, (4) Health, (5) Transportation, (6) Public economy.
While the numbers are difficult to interpret in general, the entries for administration
(col. 1) reflect size of the cantonal population served because the two output indicators
are population and number of firms.
2.4.3 Input Variables
The inputs are measured as real expenditure (CHF of 2000) on the six service categories.
This is a widespread practice (see Afonso et al., 2006 and De Borger and Kerstens, 1996).
For the categories transportation and health, only operating expenses are included (total
expenditure minus investments in new infrastructure) because annual investments contain
a strong transitory component.
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2.4.4 Determinants of DEA Efficiency
Recall the two research questions,
(1) Does a fiscal equalization program as sizable as the Switzerland contain incentives
to provide public goods less efficiently, creating a trade-off between equity and
efficiency?
(2) Does it matter whether transfer payments are earmarked or not?
The first question is investigated using three models. Model (A) relates DEA efficiency
scores to the financial potential, which determines the amount of fiscal equalization be-
tween cantons. Model (B) checks whether this influence depends only on the size of the
financial flows regardless of their direction. In model (C), fiscal equalization paid and re-
ceived is allowed to have an asymmetric impact on efficiency. The explanatory variables
are defined as follows (endogeneity issues are addressed in Section 2.5.2 below).
• Index of financial potential (F.POT ): The Swiss fiscal equalization program is based
on this indicator, with higher value implying less federal financial assistance (see
Section 2.2). It is used in model (A).
• Index of financial equalization (F.EQ): F.EQ is a modification of F.POT . It mea-
sures the absolute value of the deviation from the value α at which no aid is con-
tributed or received; formally, F.EQ = abs[F.POT − α]. Note that α differs from
the mean value of F.POT . The higher this index value, the larger is the amount of
fiscal equalization. It is used in model (B).
• Dummies for paying and receiving cantons (F.GIV = 1, F.REC = 1): F.GIV
equals 1 for cantons who are payers, while F.REC equals 1 for those who are re-
cipients. Cantons which are neither recipients nor payers constitute the benchmark
group in both cases. These variables appear in model (C).
The second research question calls for the introduction of
• Subsidies per capita (SUBS): This variable measures earmarked payments, which
are suspected to induce a particularly high degree of inefficiency (see Section 2.2
again).
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In addition, the following variables serve to control for other influences on cantonal ef-
ficiency scores that cannot be controlled for in the DEA but could influence efficiency
scores.
• Direct democracy (DIR.DEM): The degree of direct democratic control (popular
initiatives, mandatory referenda on expensive public projects) was already found
to be relevant by Pommerehne and Zweifel (1991) in the context of tax evasion.
More recently, Fischer (2004) and Feld and Matsusaka (2003) found the amount of
public services provided to be negatively related to an index of democratic control
developed by Stutzer (1999). This index is used here as well, with the expectation
of a positive relationship with efficiency.
• Decentralization (DEC): Decentralized provision of public services within a canton
has an ambiguous effect on efficiency. On the one hand, it might cause a lack of
human and technical resources in small cantons, resulting in higher cost of admin-
istration (see e.g. Smith, 1985). On the other hand, Tiebout (1956) argues that
decentralization facilitates competition, which fosters efficiency. In this work, DEC
is the share of cantonal expenditure that is transferred to the communities.
• Income per capita (INCOME): This is a component of F.POT that according to
De Borger and Kerstens (1996) has additional information content. They predict
that efficiency of local government decreases with increasing income per capita
because citizens in high-wage jurisdictions face high opportunity costs when trying
to monitor the efficiency of public good provision.
• Tax burden (TAX): This component of F.POT has additional information content
as well. In line with Tiebout (1956), a canton’s efficiency awareness is predicted to
increase with a stronger participation in tax competition. Since a low value of TAX
indicates a strong engagement in tax competition, it is hypothesized to go along
with a high degree of efficiency, ceteris paribus.
• Disparities (TOPOGR, I.STRUCT , and POP.STRUCT ): These variables reflect
exogenously given disparities, which are expected to cause higher cost and hence
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lower efficiency in the provision of public services. They enter the new fiscal equal-
ization formula. TOPOGR adjusts for geographic differences while I.STRUCT
controls for difference of community size, the employment rate, and population
density. POP.STRUCT denotes the shares of immigrants and citizens older than
80 years, with equal weights.
• Cost of housing (P.HOUS): The cost of housing differs substantially between can-
tons. It is an important component of the cost of living, which is adjusted for in
the wages of public employees and hence influences the cost of providing public
services.
• Culture (CULT.F = 1): The French- and German-speaking parts of Switzerland
differ in many ways, possibly also in terms of efficiency (Fischer, 2004). Thus,
CULT.F = 1 if the canton is predominantly French-speaking.
• Year of observation (Y 2001 = 1, Y 2002 = 1, Y 2003 = 1, and Y 2004 = 1): This
set of dummy variables indicates the year of observation (base year is 2000).
2.5 Empirical Results
This section first discusses the robust DEA efficiency scores. The assumption (to be
relaxed below) is that the 26 cantons belong to the same universe, meaning that all
cantons face the same circumstances in their provision of public goods. In a second
step, efficiency scores are related to fiscal equalization and other socioeconomic factors
of interest.
2.5.1 DEA Analysis
With the six output indicators derived from eq. (2.6) and expenditures changing from year
to year, an annual DEA for the years 2000 to 2004 can be performed. Table 2.5 shows the
results for the year 2004. The robust efficiency scores are calculated under the assumption
of constant returns to scale, indicating potential cost improvements achievable by a radial
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movement to a technically and scale-efficient reference point on the frontier. There are
two super-efficient cases that are assigned a score of 1.00 (see Section 2.3 again).
Table 2.5: DEA Efficiency Scores, 26 Swiss Cantons (2004)
Cantons Rank (1-6)a) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) SD
ZH 25 0.74 0.71 0.42 0.67 0.76 0.53 0.84 0.15
BE 11 0.88 0.87 0.70 0.76 0.81 0.71 0.88 0.08
LU 20 0.82 0.64 0.74 0.91 0.63 0.67 0.79 0.11
UR 22 0.82 0.71 0.65 0.82 0.76 0.69 0.73 0.06
SZ 15 0.86 [1.00] 0.75 0.81 0.56 0.71 0.75 0.14
OW 5 0.95 0.78 0.97 0.93 0.72 0.88 0.78 0.10
NW 10 0.89 [1.00] 0.79 0.78 0.64 0.78 0.77 0.12
GL 6 0.95 0.81 0.91 0.85 0.97 0.74 0.77 0.09
ZG 16 0.85 0.95 0.51 0.69 0.81 0.69 0.92 0.16
FR 14 0.86 0.79 0.74 0.93 0.69 0.67 0.77 0.09
SO 12 0.88 0.78 0.73 0.81 0.61 0.81 0.96 0.11
BS 26 0.64 0.84 0.42 0.78 0.72 0.43 0.21 0.25
BL 18 0.85 0.68 0.70 0.84 0.69 0.62 [1.00] 0.14
SH 13 0.88 0.71 0.59 0.84 0.73 0.99 0.82 0.13
AR 8 0.93 0.64 0.91 0.86 0.93 0.61 0.98 0.16
AI 2 0.97 0.92 0.86 0.98 0.83 0.61 0.97 0.14
SG 19 0.84 0.89 0.65 0.80 0.74 0.49 0.89 0.16
GR 17 0.85 0.61 0.90 0.88 0.63 0.52 [1.00] 0.19
AG 3 0.95 0.82 0.82 [1.00] 0.59 0.95 0.91 0.14
TG [1] [1.00] 0.84 0.66 0.85 [1.00] [1.00] 0.99 0.14
TI 7 0.95 0.62 0.79 [1.00] 0.85 0.78 [1.00] 0.14
VD 21 0.82 0.67 0.60 [1.00] 0.55 0.71 0.84 0.16
VS 4 0.95 0.82 [1.00] 0.96 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.10
NE 23 0.77 0.64 0.55 0.98 0.39 0.53 [1.00] 0.25
GE 24 0.75 0.42 0.38 0.91 [1.00] 0.65 0.64 0.25
JU 9 0.89 0.70 0.81 0.88 0.45 0.93 [1.00] 0.20
No. Eff. 1 2 1 3 2 1 5
Outliers 0 0 0 0 TG 0 TI
Mean 0.87 0.76 0.71 0.87 0.72 0.71 0.85
Min 0.64 0.42 0.38 0.67 0.39 0.43 0.21
SD 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.17
(1)Administration, (2) Public safety, (3) Education, (4) Health, (5) Transportation, (6) Public economy.
a) Mean of the six categories, normalized by the maximum value.
Starting with the overall scores, the rural canton of Thurgovia (TG) attains 100 per-
cent technical efficiency (score of 1.00). Two more cantons (again rural) come close, viz.
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes (AI, 0.97) and Argovia (AG, 0.97). Indeed, 30 percent of all can-
tons have a performance score higher than 0.90. At the other extreme, Basel-City (BS)
is identified as the most inefficient canton (0.64). Thus, its expenditure could have been
lowered by 37 percent while still maintaining the same output level. Other urban cantons,
viz. Zurich (ZH, 0.74), Geneva (GE, 0.75) already perform much better. However, dif-
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ferences between rural and urban cantons are not surprising. The well-known disparities
caused by higher population densities and more complex industry structures, which by
the way are taken into account in the fiscal equalization program, cannot be incorporated
in DEA. But the second step analysis adjusts for it with three variables from the new
fiscal equalization program to enable unbiased estimates of the hypotheses.
The question arises of whether the year 2004 is representative of the observation period
2000 to 2004. Figure 2.2 provides an answer, ranking cantons according to their five-year
median values along with their estimated quartile ranges and 95 percent confidence bands.
The findings of Table 2.5 are confirmed in that TG remains leader while BS consistently
Figure 2.2: Overall Efficiency Scores, 26 Swiss Cantons (2000-4)a)
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a)For the acronyms, see footnote No. 1.
is last. While changes in ranking do occur (see the overlapping interquartile ranges), they
are very limited. One reason for volatility over time could be investment in infrastructure.
For example, ZG shows an improvement from rank 19 in 2000 to 15 in 2004 but drops to
place 23 in 2003, because of spending heavily on investment without charging projects to
the capital account. Yet, comparable GL with a similar degree of volatility in performance
achieved a consistent improvement over the five years [from 0.84 (rank 18) to 0.94 (rank
6)]. In sum, variations over time are too limited and unsystematic to undermine the
robustness of the overall ranking.
Another question of interest is whether the leader TG is the champion in all six
categories of public service distinguished. If this were the case, Tiebout competition
would unfold with full vigor. However, Table 2.5 shows that TG has a low efficiency
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score in public safety (0.66). Conversely, last-ranked BS does attain an average value
in administration (0.84), permitting cantonal government to cater to voters especially
interested in administrative services. Moreover, low overall scores do not necessarily go
along with high standard errors across the six categories (see last column of Table 2.5).
Bottom-ranked BS has a high standard error of 0.25 while UR with rank 23 has one
of only 0.06. Thus, small and homogenous UR can survive Tiebout competition since
neighboring (more urban) LU has twice as much variation [SD 0.11], while its rank is
almost the same. In sum, Tiebout competition is limited even in a country as markedly
federalist as Switzerland.
In a federal state, another major issue is centralization vs. decentralization. In the case
of Switzerland, the debate has been focusing on education (see Barankay and Lockwood,
2007). Lack of coordination between the cantons has been cited as a reason for the rather
mediocre performance of the Swiss educational system in the PISA study (OECD, 2006).
However, these criticisms might be overstated. The average performance score for educa-
tion (3) is 0.87 (SD 0.09). This beats the score of 0.76 (SD 0.14) for public administration
(1), which is generally believed to perform well in international comparison.
2.5.2 Estimation of the Determinants of DEA Efficiency
Next, it is of interest to see whether fiscal equalization has an influence on the efficiency
scores of the 26 cantons over the years 2000 to 2004. In total, 130 observations (26*5)
are available for estimating eq. (2.4) of Section 2.3. Disparities in the provision of public
goods are reflected by the indicators discussed in Section 2.4.4.
Estimation results for the three models outlined in Section 2.4.4 are displayed in Ta-
ble 2.6, after performing tests for endogeneity, heteroscedasticity, and nonlinearity. Fiscal
equalization could be endogenous to efficiency because highly efficient jurisdictions are
made to contribute to the program. However, a Hausman test does not suggest rejection
of the exogeneity assumption. This is not really surprising because the Swiss fiscal equal-
ization is not adjusted every year, possibly making an observation period of five years too
short for detecting reverse causality. Heteroscedasticity is not a problem either accord-
ing to a Breusch-Pagan test. Finally, linearity need not be rejected with the exception
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of SUBS2, TAX2 and POP.STRUCT2. Earmarked payments as well as tax burden,
decentralization, and population structure have a nonlinear influence on the performance
of the cantons. Several interaction terms proved significant, too; their inclusion does not
markedly affect parameter estimates, however. Estimation results turn out to be robust
for the three models. Most of the variables have expected signs and are significant at the
90 percent confidence level or better.
Table 2.6: Tobit Estimates of DEA Efficiency Scores
Model (A)a) Model (B)a) Model (C)a)
Variables Coef Elasticityb) Coef Elasticityb) Coef Elasticityb)
F.POT -5.8E-03*** -7.0E-01
F.EQ -7.6E-04*** -3.8E-02
F.GIV -2.1E-01* -8.4E-02
F.REC -2.8E-02 -2.4E-02
SUBS -1.6E-04*** -2.7E-01 -1.8E-04*** -3.0E-01 -1.3E-04*** -2.2E-01
DIR.DEM -3.0E-01*** -1.7E+00 -7.1E-02*** -3.9E-01 -1.4E-01*** -7.9E-01
DEC 2.0E+00** 1.1E+00 3.3E+00*** 1.7E+00 2.9E+00** 1.5E+00
INCOME -2.8E-04 -3.7E-02
TAX -5.6E-03*** -7.9E-01 -6.4E-03*** -9.0E-01 -7.7E-03*** -1.1E+00
TOPOGR -1.4E-04** -2.4E-02 -6.2E-06 -1.1E-03 -5.7E-05 -1.0E-02
I.STRUCT -3.3E-01*** -7.2E-01 -2.3E-01*** -5.0E-01 -2.3E-01*** -4.8E-01
POP.STRUCT -3.1E-01*** -5.3E-01 -2.7E-01*** -4.8E-01 -2.6E-01*** -4.6E-01
P.HOUS -6.3E-01*** -8.5E-01 -6.2E-01*** -8.4E-01 -6.5E-01*** -8.9E-01
CULT.F -6.0E-02*** -1.8E-02 -4.1E-02*** -1.2E-02 -4.0E-02*** -1.2E-02
SUBS2 2.3E-08*** 8.8E-02 1.5E-08*** 5.6E-02 1.3E-08*** 5.0E-02
TAX2 3.1E-05*** 4.8E-01 3.2E-05*** 4.9E-01 3.9E-05*** 6.0E-01
POP.STRUCT2 7.9E-02*** 2.7E-01 6.3E-02*** 2.1E-01 5.8E-02*** 2.0E-01
DEC2 -5.0E+00*** -1.1E+00 -5.0E+00*** -1.1E+00 -5.4E+00*** -1.2E+00
SUBS : F.POT 1.2E-07 1.4E-02
SUBS : F.EQ 1.1E-06*** 7.7E-02
SUBS : F.GIV 2.1E-05 5.9E-03
SUBS : F.REC 2.3E-05 3.0E-02
F.POT :
DIR.DEM
1.3E-03*** 6.4E-01
F.GIV :
DIR.DEM
4.0E-02** 6.9E-02
F.REC :
DIR.DEM
2.8E-05 9.3E-05
DIR.DEM :
DEC
4.2E-01*** 8.9E-01 1.2E-01*** 2.6E-01 2.9E-01*** 6.2E-01
I.STRUCT :
P.HOUS
2.9E-01*** 6.5E-01 2.0E-01*** 4.5E-01 2.0E-01*** 4.5E-01
Observation 114 114 114
L-Likelihood 384.1 374.9 372.2
*,**,*** Significant at the 90%, 95% and 99% confidence level, respectively.
a) Time dummies for the years 2004, 2003, 2002 and 2001 are not shown.
b) Elasticities evaluated at sample means.
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In model (A), a negative sign is obtained for F.POT . Use of index of financial po-
tential that determines fiscal equalization payments therefore seems to lower efficiency
systematically (elasticity -0.7) after controlling for exogenously given disparities and other
variables affecting the cost of public good provision. Thus, cantons with high financial
potential may have an incentive to underperform. In model (B), the absolute value of
payments enters with F.EQ. Not surprisingly, F.EQ has a significantly negative sign
too, suggesting that fiscal equalization as such lowers technical efficiency in the provision
of public goods. Finally, model (C) indicates that paying cantons (elasticity -0.084) are
more influenced than receiving cantons (elasticity -0.024) with regard to efficiency.
In sum, the evidence of Table 2.6 provides an answer to question (1) of Section 2.2 by
supporting the notion that fiscal equalization undermines cantonal efficiency in Switzer-
land for both receivers and payers, but even more for payers, who are the cantons with
high financial potential. This difference is intuitive because payers have more reason to
respond to fiscal equalization with inefficiency than receivers. Expecting no benefit from
redistribution, they rather waste their money than to give it to financially disadvantaged
cantons. Thus, any public good with a positive net benefit is provided, whereas only
those with above-average net benefits contribute to the canton’s technical efficiency. Be-
ing financially constrained, receiving cantons want to ensure that their most productive
projects are financed; they extend this list only in order to justify their need for redis-
tribution. While estimated elasticities are below one throughout, fiscal equalization in
the case of Switzerland does give rise to the equity-efficiency trade-off described Stiglitz
(1988).
Question (2) of Section 2.2 asks whether earmarked federal subsidies (SUBS) have an
especially strong (negative) effect on cantonal efficiency. Whereas general payments can
be used by the canton where it believes to generate the highest benefit for its citizens,
earmarked subsidies may result in gold plating of projects and hence inefficiency. Indeed,
Table 2.6 shows SUBS to have a negative sign in all three models with estimated elastic-
ities between -0.2 and -0.3. Therefore, subsidies may encourage inefficiency, as claimed in
the Swiss case e.g. by Frey et al. (1994). Therefore, the new equalization formula of 2008
which minimizes earmarked payments has the potential to reduce technical inefficiency
in the provision of public goods compared to its predecessor.
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Some of the other explanatory variables are of interest as well. Foremost, DIR.DEM
and DEC, which capture two unique features of Switzerland, contradict theoretical ex-
pectations. The negative sign of DIR.DEM suggests that direct democratic control
lowers rather than increases technical efficiency. This seems to contradict the findings of
Fischer (2004) as well as Feld and Matsusaka (2003), who however studied the amount of
public services provided rather than technical efficiency. Still, lower amounts can go along
with lower efficiency if direct democracy should mainly delay (notably through referenda)
planning that is “on target” in terms of efficiency. On the other hand, decentralization
has the expected effect in that the coefficient of DEC is positive throughout, confirming
Barankay and Lockwood (2007) who examined the impact of decentralization on pro-
ductive efficiency in public education. The negative effects emphasized by Smith (1985)
apparently are more than compensated by the positive ones due to Tiebout competition,
which however are subject to diminishing marginal returns (see the negative coefficient
of DEC2).
In addition, TAX shows the expected negative sign, suggesting that cantons with a
low tax burden exhibit higher performance, a state of affairs conducive to strong Tiebout
competition. However, the positive sign of the quadratic term points to a rapidly dimin-
ishing effect as soon as the tax burden starts to increase, with the critical value of 90.32
in model (A) and 100 in model (B), respectively (the average tax burden of Switzerland is
set to 100). The positive sign of TAX found by De Borger and Kerstens (1996) therefore
also holds for Switzerland as soon as it exceeds the average. Thus, both extremely low
and high tax burdens cause efficiency gains, because of tax competition on the one hand
and because of increasing monitoring by citizens on the other.
Finally, it is of interest for policy to know whether the determinants entering the new
fiscal equalization formula (TOPOGR, I.STRUCT , and POP.STRUCT ) to adjust for
resource disparities are relevant or not. The three variables are negatively related to DEA
efficiency scores regardless of model specification. Therefore, the 2008 reform is likely to
achieve its objective because it introduces exogenous factors in the equalization formula
that seem to have a significant influence on the heterogeneity of public good provision.
Finally, the negative coefficient of P.HOUS shows that the cost of housing factors into
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the cost of public services and hence inefficiency. Since it is largely exogenous, it could
also be included in the fiscal equalization formula.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper was to measure efficiency in the provision of public services
applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), which maximizes the distance between
an output bundle and an input bundle. The country analyzed is Switzerland, which is
characterized by a high degree of federalism permitting Tiebout competition on the one
hand and a sizable fiscal equalization program on the other. DEA shadow prices serve
to derive the weights for aggregating the six public service categories into an overall
output indicator for the 26 cantons, while inputs are equated to their real expenditure
over the years 2000 to 2004. In a second step, DEA efficiency scores are related to the
indicator ’financial potential’ which governs the Swiss fiscal equalization scheme designed
to alleviate disparities between cantons.
The main results are the following. First, efficiency scores indicate better performance
of small rural cantons than of urban ones and are robust over the five years investigated. A
comparison over the six service categories further shows that cantons with a high overall
performance do not automatically outperform in all of them, preventing any one of them
from becoming dominant in Tiebout competition. Second, financial equalization is nega-
tively related to cantonal efficiency, with an especially marked effect on payers. Schemes
designed to mitigate disparities that are deemed unacceptable not only by politicians but
the citizenry as well (the pertinent constitutional amendment survived a popular referen-
dum in the case of Switzerland) may thus have the undesirable side effect of undermining
incentives for efficiency. Jurisdictions who are payers and receivers both seek to keep
their ’financial potential’ low – the former because this serves to ease their burden, the
latter because they expect to receive more transfer payments and subsidies notably by
producing public services at higher than minimum cost. Therefore, the equity-efficiency
trade-off noted by Stiglitz (1988) seems indeed to exist in the case of Switzerland. Third,
earmarked federal subsidies (the main component of transfer payments prior to the 2008
reform) are negatively related to cantonal efficiency as well. Substitution of these ear-
Fiscal Equalization, Tiebout Competition, and Incentives for Efficiency 35
marked payments by freely disposable lump-sum ones as part of the new equalization
program implemented in 2008 is therefore likely to enhance cantonal performance.
This analysis suffers from several limitations. Above all, DEA efficiency scores consti-
tute a technocratic measure, being silent on the question of whether the services provided
reflect the preferences of citizens. Also, some of the explanatory variables used to predict
efficiency scores may not be fully exogenous in the long term. In particular, INCOME
possibly not only influences efficiency as a taste variable but could be the consequence
of cantonal efficiency as well. In spite of these limitations, the analysis not only identifies
the equity-efficiency trade-off that federally organized countries (such as Switzerland)
face when implementing a fiscal equalization scheme but also provides guidance on how
to structure it in terms of earmarked and freely disposable payments.
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Abstract: With prospective payment of hospitals becoming more common, measuring
their performance is gaining in importance. However, the standard cost frontier model
yields biased efficiency scores because it ignores technological heterogeneity between
hospitals. In this paper, efficiency scores are derived from a random intercept and
an extended random parameter frontier model, designed to overcome the problem of
unobserved heterogeneity in stochastic frontier analysis. Using a sample of 100 Swiss
hospitals covering the years 2004 to 2007 and applying Bayesian inference, significant
heterogeneity is found, suggesting rejection of the standard cost frontier model. Es-
timated inefficiency decreases even below the 14 percent reported by Hollingsworth
(2008) for European countries. Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity would make
hospitals rated below 85 percent efficiency according to the standard model gain up to
12 percentage points, serving to highlight the importance of heterogeneity correction in
the estimation of hospital performance.
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3Accounting for Heterogeneity in the Measurement of
Hospital Performance
3.1 Introduction
Performance-based prospective hospital payment has recently been introduced in several
countries. It has greatly increased the importance of accurately measuring firm-specific
performance, defined here in terms of operating costs per casemix-adjusted patient case.
The challenge for policy makers is to pay for efficiency; however, this calls for filtering out
differences that are caused by inefficiencies rather than heterogeneities due to exogenous
influences.
In response to this need, there has been a growing body of research into the determi-
nants of cost variability between hospitals (see Hollingsworth, 2008, Jacobs et al., 2006,
and Worthington, 2004 for overviews of the literature). Specifically, the meta-analysis by
Hollingsworth (2008) finds evidence of inefficiency in the hospitals of the United States
and several European countries, amounting to a potential for cost reduction of 18 percent
and 14 percent, respectively. Compared to these estimates, Switzerland is on the high
side with Steinmann and Zweifel (2003), based on a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA),
coming up with 30 percent. In a comparison with Germany (the land of Saxony), Stein-
mann et al. (2004) once more found Swiss hospitals to be relatively inefficient. Using a
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), Farsi and Filippini (2006) put the potential of cost
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reduction to 20 percent on average, which would translate into 7 percent of Switzer-
land’s total health care expenditure (55 bn CHF) in 2007. However, these estimates do
not account for heterogeneity in production technology, which is likely to be particularly
marked due to Swiss federalism.
Efficiency scores from the articles cited above are simply defined as the ratio of observed
cost to a value on the estimated single technology cost frontier (Farrell, 1957).1 In the
case of SFA introduced by Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and Aigner et al. (1977),
this ratio is given by
Cit
CS(Xit;α, β)
= eui+vit , (3.1)
with Cit is the (arithmetic) cost of hospital i = 1, ..., N at time t = 1, ..., T , CS(Xit;α, β)
is an estimated minimum cost for outputs and input prices comprised in a NT × (K + 1)
matrix X, α is the unknown intercept, β is a K × 1 vector of unknown slope parameters
of the cost function, ui is a random term with positive values only reflecting inefficiency,
and vit a conventional random error (see Section 3.2 below for details). Any difference
in technology is captured in the composite error term ui + vit, which could bias the
estimates of the inefficiency scores ui (see also Greene, 2004a). This is particularly the
case for Switzerland, where hospitals have to operate in different regulatory environments,
causing them to provide health care services using different technologies. Controlling for
heterogeneity may therefore lead to inefficiency estimates that are more in line with those
of the United States and the European countries.
There have been several approaches for dealing with this problem. The first is to
introduce fixed effects in the SFM or in the distribution of ui (see e.g. Worthington,
2004). Since the choice of the dummy variables must rely on observable characteristics
of the hospital, this solution is limited to ’observable’ heterogeneity, leaving potential for
’unobservable’ heterogeneity to bias estimated inefficiency scores. Provided panel data
available, a true random effects model can be estimated (see e.g. Farsi et al., 2008, Farsi
et al., 2006, Greene, 2005b, and Greene, 2004b). This is a special case of the Random
Intercept Frontier Model (RIFM) to be presented below, which enables cost frontiers to
vary between hospitals. Still, the RIFM is not without limitations because it only al-
1 Simple cost ratios, often used for policy purposes, are not sufficient because they neglect both
economies of scale and heterogeneity of technology.
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lows the intercept α to be stochastic and assumes heterogeneity to be homoscedastic.
Additional flexibility is afforded by the Random Parameter Frontier Model (RPFM), a
generalization of the SFM and the RIFM, which additionally allows the slopes β vary
between hospitals. Implementation of RPFM until recently was hampered by the require-
ment of large computational power and panel data of sufficient quality. Improvement on
both counts have rendered them feasible in the meantime (see e.g. Widmer, 2011, Huang,
2004, Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004, and Tsionas, 2002).
In this paper, we analyze the influence of unobserved heterogeneity between Swiss
hospitals using a SFM, a RIFM, and an extended RPFM for SFA. Section 3.2 contains
additional details for these models as well as for the Bayesian approach adopted in the
model specification and parameter estimation. The database of about 100 Swiss hospitals
covering the years 2004 to 2007 is presented in Section 3.3. Estimation results confirm
the existence of unobserved heterogeneity in Swiss hospitals, suggesting rejection of the
SFM. On average, the SFM overestimates Swiss hospital inefficiency by about 6 percent.
Section 3.4 considers the implications of this study for hospital managers and policy
makers, and concludes.
3.2 Modeling Unobservable Heterogeneity
It is common practice to define heterogeneity as time-invariant cost variation that is
exogenous in the sense that it cannot be manipulated by management at least in the
short run. This definition is adopted here.2 As a benchmark, the specification of the cost
function in the presence of observable heterogeneity is presented first (Section 3.2.1); this
provides the point of departure for the modeling of unobservable heterogeneity in Section
3.2.2, which likely is the more important component given that the quality of (largely
non-profit) hospital management is not easily measured.
2 On the longer run, the choice of technology can be influenced by hospital management. The presence
of inferior technology becomes a component of management inefficiency in this case.
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3.2.1 The Standard Frontier Model with Observable Hetero-
geneity
When heterogeneity is perfectly observable, the SFM can be augmented in a way permit-
ting to estimate consistent efficiency scores (Pitt and Lee, 1981). Let there be repeated
observations t = 1, ..., T for all hospitals i = 1, ..., N , and let heterogeneity Zi be com-
pletely reflected by a N ×L matrix of observable, time-invariant characteristics. Using a
Cobb-Douglas cost function in logs for simplicity, the cost frontier can be specified as
Cit = α + γ
′Zi + β′Xit + γ′XitZi + ui + vit, i = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ..., T, (3.2)
ui
iid∼ f+N [0, σ2u] with Cov(ui;α,Xit, Zi, vit) = 0, (3.3)
vit
iid∼ fN [0, σ2v ] with Cov(vi;α,Xit, Zi, ui) = 0, (3.4)
with parameters defined in the Introduction section. Note that observable heterogeneity
enters the cost function in two ways. First, the intercept α is augmented by a hospital-
specific term γ′Zi. This is called separable heterogeneity because it captures cost vari-
ability that is unrelated to the hospital’s technology, such as size of its catchment area.3
Second, the slopes β pertaining to outputs and factor prices are individualized by γ′XitZi.
This is non-separable heterogeneity reflecting differences in technology such as the amount
and vintage of capital in use.
In this model, firm-specific inefficiency ui is assumed to be time-invariant, uncorrelated
with the deterministic part of the cost function as well as with random noise vit, and to
follow a one-sided distribution supported on the interval [0,∞) such as the half normal,
truncated normal, exponential, gamma or Weibull distribution. Alternatively one could
model inefficiency as a time-invariant fixed effect (Schmidt and Sickles, 1984), which
allows for correlation with production technology.4 But because heterogeneity is assumed
to be time-invariant here, this variant will not be pursued.
3 Greene (2005a) permits correlation between separable heterogeneity and production technology in
his true fixed effects model.
4 The fixed effect model has at least two drawbacks: (1) it only measures relative inefficiency, (2) no
time-invariant technology parameters are allowed in the cost function.
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Given eqs. (3.2) to (3.4) as an option, cost variability in logarithms is given by
Cit − CH(Xit, Zi;α, β, γ) = ui + vit, (3.5)
where CH(Xit, Zi;α, β, γ) is individualized for each hospital as shown in eq. (3.2). It en-
ables the hospital regulator to separate cost variability related to differences in technology
from inefficiency ui and random noise vit. The resulting inefficiency scores are no longer
biased by heterogeneity and can be used for performance-based reimbursement.
However, this result does not hold as soon as heterogeneity is not completely observable
but has an unobservable component Z∗i , resulting in terms γ
′Z∗i and γ
′XitZ∗i in the error
term of eq. (3.2). If the regulator uses the conventional benchmark CH of eq. (3.2), the
residuals become
Cit − CH(Xit, Zi;α, β, γ) = γ′Z∗i + γ′XitZ∗i + ui + vit. (3.6)
The existence of (time-invariant) unobservable heterogeneity Z∗i now causes bias in
the measurement of hospital performance in two ways:
• Rather than estimating true inefficiency ui, eq. (3.2) will estimate an artificially
augmented inefficiency term u˜it = ui + γ
′Z∗i + γ
′XitZ∗i ;
• To the extent that unobserved heterogeneity Z∗i is correlated with either observed
heterogeneity Zi or outputs and factor prices Xit estimates of technology parameters
α and β are biased as well since Cov(u˜it, Zi) 6= 0, Cov(u˜it, Xit) 6= 0.
With both inefficiency scores and technology parameters biased, prospective payment
runs the risk of rewarding some hospitals for being seemingly efficient while punishing
others for being seemingly inefficient.
U.S. experience with prospective payment suggests that unobservable heterogeneity
could be substantial. If performance-based reimbursement took into account all relevant
determinants of hospital cost, one would expect hospitals to discard technologies giv-
ing rise to characteristics that are not paid for and to move to the cost-efficient level.
However, Keeler (1990) found that U.S. hospitals still have a great deal of unexplained
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cost variability although prospective payment had been in place since 1983. One reason is
that changes in hospital technology are particularly costly, causing hospitals to be slow in
adopting new technologies. Evidently, more advanced estimation techniques are necessary
to disentangle latent heterogeneity from inefficiency for prospective hospital payment to
have the desired efficiency-enhancing effects.5
3.2.2 The Random Parameter Model with Unobservable
Heterogeneity
The discussion of the preceding subsection led to the conclusion that in the case of
hospitals, part of their technological heterogeneity is unobservable for years to come.
Therefore, reimbursement arguably should take into account both observable and unob-
servable heterogeneity. One way to achieve this is the RPFM (the RIFM allows only the
intercept rather than all parameters to be random and will not be expounded separately
below). A RPFM estimates an individual cost function for each hospital, admitting of
both observable and unobservable heterogeneity (see e.g. Widmer, 2011, Greene, 2004b,
Huang, 2004, Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004, and Tsionas, 2002). To save on notation, the
case of unobservable heterogeneity only is presented below. No ex-ante information on
heterogeneity is needed, except for the assumption that it is time-invariant and normally
distributed over individual hospitals. This is achieved by introducing a [(K+1)×1] vector
of time-invariant random variables wi ∼ N [0, σ2w] that changes the intercept of the cost
function to become αi = α + wi (separable heterogeneity) and to the slope parameters
to become βi = β + wi (non-separable heterogeneity), resulting in
Cit = (α + wi) + (β + wi)
′Xit + uit + vit, or (3.7)
Cit = αi + β
′
iXit + uit + vit. (3.8)
In the special case where wi captures all existing heterogeneity, the RPFM can be
transformed back into a SFM by substituting wi by γ
′Zi in eq. (3.7).
5 As stated by Newhouse (1996), one option to overcome this problem is to use non fully prospective
reimbursement systems, that are not fully prospective.
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However, this specification is somewhat restrictive because it assumes both the inter-
cept and the slopes of the cost function to be time-independent. This neglects the fact
that new medical technology affects the whole hospital industry in very much the same
way (such as the introduction of SCAT scanners). Denoting these changes by a vector of
time dummies Mt, eq. (3.8) can be generalized to read,
Cit = αit + β
′
itXit + uit + vit with
αit = α¯ + δ
′Mt + wi and α¯t = α¯ + δ′Mt;
βit = β¯ + δ
′Mt + wi and β¯t = β¯ + δ′Mt. (3.9)
This specification allows to disentangle inefficiency from unobservable heterogeneity
both variable and time-invariant. Separable heterogeneity is captured by the random
intercept αit = α¯ + δ
′Mt + wi, where α¯ is the mean intercept over all hospitals. Non-
separable heterogeneity in technology parameters is captured by a (K × 1) vector of
hospital-specific parameters βit = β¯ + δ
′Mt + wi.
To derive individual effects, assume wi to follow a multivariate normal distribution
wi ∼ fMN [w¯,Σ] , with Σ ∼ fW
 σ2wα σwα,wβ
σwα,wβ σ
2
wβ
 , (3.10)
with w¯ equal to zero. Σ is Wishart distributed with a [(K+1)× (K+1)] positive definite
covariance matrix S = (σ2wα , σ
2
wβ
, σwα,wβ), denoting unobserved heterogeneity between
hospitals. For Σ = 0 no time-invariant heterogeneity exists and the random parameter
model simplifies to a SFM with no variation in βit and αit.
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For the Bayesian estimation to be performed in Section 3.3, the posterior distribution
for the random parameter model needs to be derived. It is given by
p(α, α¯, β, β¯, δ, u,Σ, σ−2v , σ
−2
u ;C,X,M) ∝ p(α¯, β¯, δ,Σ, σ−2v , σ−2u )
×
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
1√
2piσ2v
exp
[
− 1
2σ2v
(Cit − [αit + β′itXit + uit])2
]
×
N∏
i=1
(2pi)−K/2|Σ|−1/2exp
[
−1
2
(wi − w¯)′Σ−1 (wi − w¯)
]
×
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
p(uit, σ
−2
u ), (3.11)
where probability distributions p(α¯, β¯, δ,Σ, σ−2v , σ
−2
u ) for the priors remain to be specified
in Section 3.3.1. The likelihood function in eq. (3.11) is as in Griffin and Steel (2007),
normally distributed with σ2v as the variance of the random noise vit = Cit − [αit +
β′itXit + uit] and with αit and βit as in eq. (3.9). The last term of eq. (3.11) points to a
gain in flexibility over classical maximum likelihood applications, where a joint density
function of the random noise v and the inefficiency term u is specified. Here, only random
noise enters the likelihood function, while inefficiency is estimated along with the other
parameters of the cost function.
The random intercept αit and technology parameters βit are estimated at three levels.
At the first level, the overall influences on hospital costs (α¯, β¯) are determined, corre-
sponding to the first factor following the proportionality sign of eq. (3.11); the second-level
estimates of time-specific effects (α¯t, β¯t) defined in eq. (3.9) and the third-level estimates
of individual values (αit, βit) are derived from the multivariate normal distribution shown
in eq. (3.11). Finally, inefficiency p(u, σ−2u ) given by the last factor of eq. (3.11) is esti-
mated at two levels. The first-level estimate corresponds to the population mean. The
second-level estimates yield firm-specific inefficiency scores uit.
Note that estimates of the unknown parameters can be derived by the marginal posteri-
ors of eq. (3.11). However, it is not always possible to compute the posteriors analytically.
Therefore, iterative Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) simulation is used, which in-
volves iterative sampling from posterior parameter densities. Here, we use WINBUGS to
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derive the estimates (see Ntzoufras, 2009 for an introduction to Bayesian analysis with
WINBUGS).
The model formulation of eq. (3.9) is quite general, containing many other variants of
RPFM cited as special cases. For example, if Mt turn out to be zero for all covariates,
it reduces to the one described by Greene (2004b) where all parameters are allowed
to vary between hospitals but are constant over time. Furthermore, if additionally only
technology parameters contain heterogeneity, it reduces to the one of Tsionas (2002), with
a common intercept for all hospitals. If only the intercept controls for heterogeneity, it
corresponds to the true random effects model of Greene (2005a) where all cost functions
have the same slopes, adjusting only for separable heterogeneity. This is similar to the
applied RIFM but with heterogeneity that is constant over time. Finally, if additionally
wi is zero for all parameters, the RPFM reduces to a SFM with no heterogeneity in the
cost function.
3.3 Empirical Application to Swiss Hospitals Using
Bayesian Inference
In this section, we analyze the effect of unobserved heterogeneity on the performance
of Swiss hospitals with three SFA formulations, a Random Parameter Frontier Model
(RPFM) outlined in Section 3.2.2, a Random Intercept Frontier Model (RIFM) as a
special case of the RPFM, and a Standard Frontier Model (SFM).
3.3.1 Data and Econometric Specification of the Cost Function
The data used in this study are provided by the annual reports of the Federal Office
of Public Health. They include 333 Swiss hospitals for the time period 2004 to 2007,
comprising information on 5 university hospitals (K111), 23 central hospitals (K112),
27 large regional hospitals (K121), 46 medium regional hospitals (K122), 46 small re-
gional hospitals (K123), 28 specialized surgery hospitals (K231), and sundry hospitals,
viz. psychiatric and rehabilitation clinics. In total, 127 of these 333 units are private,
non-subsidized hospitals.
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In the interest of comparability, the sundry category was discarded. After purging
the data from missing values and outliers, an unbalanced panel of 405 observations of
sufficient quality is available. Variables are defined as follows:
V C : Variable operational expense per year, in thousands of CHF (VC);
X1 : CMI-adjusted inpatient cases (PCASES);
X2 : Revenue from outpatients (OUTP);
X3 : Price of labor, average wage per employee (PL);
X4 : No. of beds (BEDS);
S1 : No. of internship categories (INTERN);
S2 : No. of specialties (SPEC);
S3 : Dummy=1 for subsidized public hospitals (SUB);
S4 : Share of inpatients with supplementary insurance, in percent (INSUR);
Mt : Year dummies, t=2005, 2006, 2007 (base = 2004);
Zl : Hospital group dummies, l=K111, K112, K121, K122, K231 (base = K123).
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Min Max K111 K112 K121 K122 K123 K231
V C1) 109,296 3,925 953,586 790,609 190,380 88,122 44,830 19,538 36,387
PCASES 7,731 497 52,143 43,046 14,651 7,093 3,796 1,545 2,741
OUTP 1) 20,499 0 186,174 142,331 42,845 14,753 6,826 2,387 6,698
PL1) 101 34 188 106 103 100 100 99 108
BEDS 201 12 1,170 893 383 207 108 55 69
INTERN 18 0 134 118 32 15 10 5 3
SPEC 35 4 86 67 50 36 33 24 18
SUB2) 87 0 100 100 100 100 88 80 37
INSUR2) 25 3 100 18 19 20 25 27 47
1) in 1,000 CHF, 1 CHF=0.8 USD (2004 exchange rates).
2) in percent, SUB=100 means that 100 percent of all hospitals are subsidized.
Summary statistics are shown in Table 3.1 for all six hospital groups retained.
They suggest that technological heterogeneity between Swiss hospital groups indeed in-
fluence cost. University hospitals (K111) for example have the highest variable costs
(V C = 790, 609); this can be attributed to their high values of the two major outputs
(PCASES = 43, 046 and OUTP = 142, 331) and possibly the fact that they are all
subsidized (SUB = 100 percent) while having a small share of patients with supple-
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mentary insurance (INSUR = 18 percent). However, they also have the most intern-
ship programs (INTERN = 118) and specialties (SPEC = 67). Specialized hospitals
(K231) on the other hand are on average small hospitals with fewer internship programs
(INTERN = 3) and specialties (SPEC = 18) but are mostly non-subsidized (SUB = 37
percent) while having a high share of supplementary insured patients (INSUR = 47 per-
cent).
With these data, we can specify a cost function where variable cost (V C) depends
on two output categories (PCASES, OUTP ), one input price for labor (PL), one cap-
ital stock (BEDS), and four structural variables (INTERN , SPEC, SUB, INSUR).
Although some of them could be interpreted as observable indicators of technology (in
particular, the number of specialties offered), they are treated as a category of their own
here. Intercept and technology parameters are reflected by a linear function of dummies
for different hospital groups (Z) and different time periods (M).6 The underlying Cobb-
Douglas cost function (subscripts i = 1, ..., N and t = 1, ..., T are dropped for simplicity)
therefore reads,
lnV C = β0 +
4∑
m=1
βmlnXm +
3∑
z=1
βzSz + u+ v, with
βk, k={0, m, z} = β¯k +
5∑
l=1
γl,kZl +
3∑
τ=1
δτ,kMτ + w. (3.12)
In order to conduct Bayesian inference from the posterior given in Section 3.2.2, prior
distributions need to be specified. The values for the hyperparameters are chosen in a
way to imply relatively vague but proper priors. In particular, the priors are assumed to
be independent,
p(α¯, β¯, γ, δ,Σ, σ−2v , σ
−2
u ) = p(α¯)p(β¯)p(γ)p(δ)p(Σ)p(σ
−2
v )p(σ
−2
u ). (3.13)
Here, p(α¯) = fN [0, θα¯], p(β¯) = fN [0, θβ¯], p(γ) = fN [0, θγ], and p(δ) = fN [0, θδ] have a
normal distribution with mean zero and a diffuse prior for their corresponding precision
6 Note that average length of stay is not included variable. Its expected value enters the casemix
adjustment of PCASES. Therefore, deviations from expected value can be interpreted as reflecting
management inefficiency u.
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θ. The precision of the likelihood function has a gamma distribution p(σ−2v ) = fG[µ, θσ−2v ]
with diffuse shape and scale parameters. Inefficiency is assumed to be half normally
distributed p(u, σ−2u ) = f
+
N [0, σ
−2
u ] with σ
−2
u = fG[5, (5 ∗ log(eff)2)]. This specification is
in line with Griffin and Steel (2007) and Koop et al. (1997), permitting to impose a priori
information with regard to mean efficiency, eff = exp(−u). Following the formulation
of Griffin and Steel (2007), eff = 0.875 is assumed for prior efficiency. Finally, the
precision of the random parameters is specified as a Wishart distribution p(Σ) = fW [S]
in accordance with eq. (3.9) with diffuse prior for the covariance matrix S.
To obtain posterior estimates, MCMC algorithms were run for 100,000 iterations, with
the first 50,000 discarded as a burn-in phase. Different assumptions for priors and starting
values converged to roughly the same values, suggesting that convergence to the posterior
distribution was achieved.
3.3.2 Econometric Results of the Cost Functions and their Cost
Variability
Table 3.2 presents estimated means and standard errors of the cost function for the
Standard Frontier Model (SFM), the Random Intercept Model (RIFM), and the Random
Parameter Model (RPFM). The RPFM is presented with estimates for α¯ and β¯. Results
of second level-estimates of the technology parameters and the intercept are shown in
Table 3.5 of the Appendix; they point to a cost shift over time, but without affecting
the slope parameters. The three variants in Table 3.2 can be assessed using the DIC
information criterion (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). The lower the DIC-value, the better the
goodness of fit of the estimated cost function, indicating that the RPFM has the best
model fit, followed by RIFM, with SFM definitely behind.
Nevertheless, the three specifications produce fairly minor variations in technology
parameters. Estimates also have the expected sign, with the only exception of BED.
Being an indicator of capital stock, it should have a negative sign, which only obtains in
the RPFM.
However, the main interest of this research revolves about technological heterogeneity
that may not be accounted for in the SFM and its influence on estimated inefficiency
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Table 3.2: Econometric Results
SFM RIFM RPFM
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Constant 2.176 (0.279) 3.334 (0.340) 4.948 (1.109)
PCASES 0.674 (0.037) 0.554 (0.045) 0.485 (0.115)
OUTP 0.025 (0.004) 0.015 (0.004) 0.013 (0.011)
PL 0.254 (0.058) 0.199 (0.049) 0.384 (0.110)
BEDS 0.256 (0.039) 0.311 (0.044) −0.148 (0.127)
INTERN 0.004 (0.000) 0.001 (0.001) 0.008 (0.006)
SPEC 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.007)
SUB 0.141 (0.036) 0.191 (0.055) 0.231 (0.529)
INSUR 0.004 (0.001) 0.004 (0.001) 0.003 (0.007)
σ2v 0.013 0.003 0.003
σ2u 0.025 0.005 0.004
σ2α − 0.021 0.001
λu 0.647 0.180 0.539
λα − 0.721 0.095
DIC −463.470 −1100.700 −1112.800
scores. The relevant estimates are σ2v , σ
2
u, and σ
2
α, which stand for the variance of random
noise, inefficiency, and separable heterogeneity, respectively; their relative importance
(expressed as a share of total error variance) is given by λu and λα. For the SFM, total
cost variability is 0.038 (σ2v = 0.013, σ
2
u = 0.025), with most variation in the inefficiency
term. According to λu = 0.647, about 65 percent of cost variability is due to inefficiency, a
share comparable to the literature cited in the Introduction section. Next, the RIFM with
σ2v = 0.003, σ
2
u = 0.005, and σ
2
α = 0.021 confirms the existence of separable heterogeneity.
It also indicates a reduction of cost variability by 23 percent (from 0.038 to 0.029), due to
its ability to capture heterogeneity in the random intercept. Variability due to inefficiency
even declines by 80 percent (from 0.025 to 0.005) and from 65 percent to 18 percent in
relative terms. Most of the cost variability between Swiss hospitals can now be attributed
to unobserved separable heterogeneity (σ2α = 0.021), accounting for 72 percent of total
cost variability. Still, non-separable heterogeneity is likely to exist, biasing coefficients
and inefficiency scores.
The RPFM confirms this concern. As to bias, the capital indicator BEDS now has
the expected negative sign (although insignificant) while the coefficient of PL attains the
high value suggested by the argument that hospital costs are mainly driven by labor cost.
As to cost variability, it again decreases markedly by 72 percent (from 0.029 RIFM to
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0.008 RPFM). Most of the cost variability that cannot be attributed to casemix – equal
to 0.042 and estimated by the residual sum of squares of a single regression with VC as a
dependent variable and PCASES as the independent variable – can now be explained by
the estimated cost function. Interestingly, while σ2v = 0.003 and σ
2
u = 0.004 change little
from RIFM, the variance of separable heterogeneity diminishes drastically from 0.021 to
0.001, with its relative importance falling from 72 percent to a more plausible 9 percent.
Consequently, the relevance of inefficiency increases to 54 percent, comparable to the
SFM value.
Indeed, the RPFM attributes most of the cost variability to the technology parameters,
as can be seen from the covariance matrix of the Wishart distribution in Table 3.3. The
variances on the diagonal show that heterogeneity is strongly related to the output indi-
cator PCASES and the structural variable INSUR, in spite of the fact that PCASES
already adjusts for heterogeneity through a casemix index. At least in the Swiss case, this
raises doubts about the relevance of the casemix index used to adjust for cost variability
in prospective payment. As to the off-diagonal entries, the negative correlation between
BEDS and PL, although insignificant, points to capital and labor being complements
in the hospital sector.
Table 3.3: Variance-Covariance Matrix of the Wishart Distribution
PCASES OUTP PL BEDS INTERN SPEC SUB INSUR
PCASES 0.505∗
OUTP −0.338 0.372∗
PL 0.257 −0.196 0.297∗
BEDS −0.216 0.171 −0.132 0.257∗
INTERN −0.125 0.088 −0.17 0.091 0.362∗
SPEC −0.074 0.057 −0.035 0.043 0.001 0.132∗
SUB 0.208 −0.144 0.09 −0.091 0.060 −0.018 0.279∗
INSUR 0.389 −0.318 0.267 −0.238 −0.159 −0.081 0.159 0.584∗
∗ Significant at the 95% confidence level.
3.3.3 Efficiency Scores
In many countries, public authorities finance major parts of hospital investment and de-
cide about the opening, closing down, and restructuring of hospitals. For these decisions,
efficiency scores may provide guidance. However, as shown in Section 3.3.2, accounting
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for heterogeneity has an impact on the cost variability attributed to inefficiency (σ2u, λu).
Therefore, a comparison of mean efficiency scores, their distribution, and development
over time between the three models is of considerable interest.
Efficient hospitals are on the estimated cost frontier (ûit = 0, êff = 1), those with
inefficiency above the frontier (ûit > 0, êff < 1). Since the uit are in logarithms, one has
êffit = exp(−ûit), (3.14)
with ûit simulated from a half normal distribution.
Table 3.4: Efficiency Values by Model Type and Year
Average Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
SFM 0.89 0.96 0.73 0.04 −1.07 4.23
RIFM 0.95 0.98 0.84 0.02 −2.78 17.70
RPFM 0.95 0.98 0.90 0.01 −2.06 12.84
2007
SFM 0.87 0.94 0.75 0.04 −0.90 3.37
RIFM 0.95 0.97 0.84 0.02 −3.74 20.56
RPFM 0.95 0.97 0.90 0.01 −3.09 16.53
2006
SFM 0.88 0.95 0.75 0.04 −0.90 3.69
RIFM 0.95 0.97 0.86 0.02 −2.69 15.55
RPFM 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.01 −0.54 3.57
2005
SFM 0.90 0.96 0.73 0.04 −1.46 6.25
RIFM 0.95 0.98 0.87 0.01 −1.77 11.61
RPFM 0.95 0.98 0.91 0.01 −1.35 8.60
2004
SFM 0.91 0.96 0.78 0.03 −1.41 5.76
RIFM 0.95 0.98 0.89 0.01 −0.96 5.77
RPFM 0.95 0.97 0.92 0.01 −1.13 5.42
Starting with the top of Table 3.4, the first thing to note is that mean efficiency scores
are 0.89 or higher, putting the potential for cost reduction at 11 percent or less. This figure
is much closer to the 14 percent reported by Hollingsworth (2008) for other European
countries and cited in the Introduction section. However, efficiency scores derived from
the SFM are markedly lower than their RIFM and RPFM counterparts. Unobserved
heterogeneity therefore does lower estimated efficiency scores, causing the potential for
cost reduction to be overstated. Over the observation period, the average SFM score is
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0.89, suggesting a cost reduction potential of 11 percent. Using the RIFM that corrects
for separable heterogeneity, one arrives at a mean score of 0.95, a value comparable to
Farsi et al. (2008) who estimated a true random effects model. Thus, prospective payment
based on a SFM would overestimate the potential for cost reduction by no less than 6
percent, causing financial distress to at least some cost-efficient hospitals who happen to
be stuck with inferior technology e.g. due to old buildings. Turning to the RPFM, which
distinguishes non-separable from separable heterogeneity, one does not find a change
away from RIFM mean scores. However, the minimum value is now 0.90 rather than
0.84, accompanied by a decrease in (negative) skewness and kurtosis.
Figure 3.1: Efficiency Estimates of the SFM, RIFM, and RPFM, Years 2004-7
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While these differences are evident from panel A of Figure 3.1, a comparison of indi-
vidual efficiency scores is even more telling. Panel B of Figure 3.1 reveals that hospitals
that would have been rated below 85 percent efficiency according to SFM gain up to
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12 percentage points when the RIFM is applied instead. Panel C shows that this gain
may even reach 15 points when the more general RPFM is used. Finally, the comparison
between RIFM and RPFM in panel D of Figure 3.1 indicates that hospitals with a RIFM
score below 0.92 still would benefit from a transition to RPFM, although the gain rarely
exceeds 5 percentage points. Therefore, at a given point of time and for a majority of
Swiss hospitals, it clearly matters whether or not unobservable heterogeneity is taken
into account in performance measurement.
Still, the three models might agree when it comes to development over time. Returning
to Table 3.4, one notices that mean SFM efficiency scores have decreased over time, from
0.91 in 2004 to 0.87 in 2007. In sharp contrast, the RIFM and RPFM measures remained
constant. Under the impression of SFM estimates, regulators would therefore have con-
cluded that prospective payments should be cut to squeeze increasingly important cost
reductions out of the hospital sector. Yet the evidence points to an increased importance
of unobservable heterogeneity (see also the hikes in skewness and kurtosis of RIFM and
RPFM scores especially in 2007). Such an increase is credible in view of the fact that
in response to sluggish economic growth, hospital renovation projects were postponed or
downsized. Failure to control for unobservable heterogeneity thus risks to punish more
and more harshly those hospitals that are hampered by outdated technology.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
With prospective reimbursement of hospitals becoming increasingly common, measure-
ment of hospital performance has been gaining in importance. However, measurement
can be biased if it fails to account for technological heterogeneity, part of which is unob-
servable. This paper seeks to shed some light on the importance of both observable and
unobservable heterogeneity by estimating a standard cost frontier model, a random inter-
cept cost frontier model, and a random parameter cost frontier model. Bayesian inference
is applied to the data of about 100 Swiss hospitals between 2004 and 2007.
Results confirm the existence of unobserved heterogeneity causing some of the cost
variability even though inpatient cases are casemix-adjusted. This means that the stan-
dard frontier model, which does not control for heterogeneity, is insufficient for deriving
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unbiased performance measures. In the case of Switzerland, the biases may be substan-
tial. Whereas Hollingsworth (2008) reports a potential for cost reductions of 14 percent
for Europe, Farsi et al. (2006) put it to 20 percent for Swiss hospitals covering the years
1997 to 2002. In this paper, a comparable standard frontier model suggests 11 percent
for 2004 to 2007, dropping to 5 percent when both observable and unobservable hetero-
geneity are controlled for. An element-wise comparison reveals that hospitals rated 85
percent efficient and less (using the standard method) would gain up to 12 percentage
points. Therefore, quite a few hospitals, although highly efficient in fact, would end up in
financial distress if regulators were to cut reimbursement rates in an attempt to enforce
the cost reductions indicated by the standard frontier model. This underlines the impor-
tance of accounting for both observable and unobservable heterogeneity in the estimation
of hospital cost frontiers.
However, this analysis is not without limitations. First, there is the risk of misspecifica-
tion causing bias in the benchmark values used to characterize the posterior distribution
governing Bayesian inference. Specifically, the cost of capital is missing from the equation;
but in addition, the indicator for unit cost of labor is an aggregate over skill categories
ranging from physicians to orderlies, and just counting the categories of internships offered
likely constitutes a poor measure of educational services provided. Second, the distinc-
tion between observable and unobservable heterogeneity remains somewhat arbitrary; for
instance, if measures of the vintage of hospital capital stock in terms of buildings and
medical technology were available, a greater part of cost variability would be attributed
to the observable component, likely causing the estimated influence of total heterogeneity
on cost to be reduced. This point relates to a third weakness, which is that management
inefficiency continues to be measured as a residual rather than by direct indicators. There-
fore, by minimizing the contribution of this residual to cost variation, random parameter
models might end up going too far in exonerating hospital management.
This said, the evidence presented here does suggest that the standard cost frontier
model is insufficient for measuring hospital performance due its failure to take technolog-
ical heterogeneity into account at all. While the evidence is limited to a sample of Swiss
hospitals, the reasons for heterogeneity are of a general nature. They also apply to other
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heavily regulated or public sectors such as energy, education, and banking, underlining
the importance of specifying cost frontier models that yield unbiased efficiency scores.
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CHAPTER IV
Does Prospective Payment Increase
Hospital (In)Efficiency? Evidence from the
Swiss Hospital Sector
Philippe K. Widmer

Abstract: Several European countries have followed the United States in introducing
prospective payment for hospitals with the expectation of achieving cost efficiency
gains. This article examines whether theoretical expectations of cost efficiency gains can
be empirically confirmed. In contrast to previous studies, the analysis of Switzerland
provides a comparison of a retrospective per diem payment system with a prospective
global budget and a payment per patient case system. Using a sample of approximately
90 public financed Swiss hospitals during the years 2004 to 2009 and Bayesian inference
of a standard and a random parameter frontier model, cost efficiency gains are found,
particularly with a payment per patient case system. Payment systems designed to
put hospitals at operating risk are more effective than retrospective payment systems.
However, hospitals are heterogeneous with respect to their production technologies,
making a random parameter frontier model the superior specification for Switzerland.7
Keywords: hospital inefficiency, prospective payment system, Bayesian inference, stochas-
tic frontier analysis
JEL classification: C11; C23; D24; I18
7 Author’s Note:The author would like to thank Alexander Ziegenbein for his efforts in the data
collection.

4Does Prospective Payment Increase Hospital
(In)Efficiency? Evidence from the Swiss Hospital
Sector
4.1 Introduction
Growing health care expenditures over the last decades have highlighted the need for
health care reforms in order to contain future cost increases. One promising approach,
which was first implemented in the U.S. and was recently adapted by many European
countries, involves the transition from retrospective (RPS) to prospective (PPS) hospi-
tal payment systems (see Smith, 2004 and Schneider, 2007 for an overview of Europe’s
reforms). The assumption is that a change to predetermined and fixed payments would
place hospitals at operating risk and would increase their cost efficiency.
Even though there are convincing theoretical arguments for cost reductions and effi-
ciency gains (Biorn et al., 2003, Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998, and Newhouse, 1996),
empirical literature is lacking. The linkage between efficiency gains and PPS has yet to
be demonstrated for the U.S. Medicare reform of 1983, which switched from RPS to a
payment per patient case system, or for any of the European countries that moved from
RPS to a payment per patient case or a global budget system (see Section 4.2 for further
information on the payment systems). For example, Borden (1988) found no significant
efficiency gains for 93 New Jersey hospitals from the years 1979 to 1984. Similar results
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were obtained by Chern and Wan (2000) when they examined the catch-up effect of tech-
nically inefficient hospitals in Virginia from 1984 to 1993. Inefficient hospitals became
even more inefficient in 1993, which is contrary to the expectations of PPS. However,
efficiency gains were shown by Morey and Dittman (1996), who analyzed the technical
inefficiency of 105 hospitals in North Carolina. The results of European reforms remain
inconclusive. While no efficiency gains were found in Austrian hospitals after funding
shifted from per diem payments to global budgets in 1997 (Sommersguter-Reichmann,
2000), gains were found in Portugal (Dismuke and Sena, 1999), Finland (Linna, 1999),
and Norway (Biorn et al., 2006). Thus, hospital costs could even increase with PPS.
Since PPS is well known to be concurrent to higher administration and supervising costs,
which is not yet included in theoretical models, the incentive for cost reduction could be
overstated.
However, these inconclusive results are most likely due to a lack of analytical rigor.
In particular, although it is widely accepted that hospitals are rather heterogeneous
in their production of health care services (Widmer et al., 2011), previously applied
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) have been
restricted to homogeneous technology. Furthermore, it is well known that results of the
frequently applied two-stage DEA approach are biased since it does not account for a
possible correlation of the independent variables with the inputs and outputs of the first-
stage DEA (Simar and Wilson, 2000). Finally, since most countries only recently switched
to PPS at the country level, the time series available for within treatment analysis have
been very short. Most studies analyze a time period of four to five years, which may be
too short for any reliable conclusion to be drawn. For instance, any changes could be
driven by unobserved exogenous shocks, such as new medical technologies or inflation,
that occurred concurrent with the implementation of PPS (Linna, 1999).
In order to overcome the limitations of previous studies, this article compares a ret-
rospective per diem system with a prospective global budget and a payment per patient
case system using data from Switzerland, where some member states (cantons) changed
to different variants of PPS while others remained with RPS. The contribution of this
article is twofold. First, it extends previous work by implementing a random parame-
ter frontier model to control for the importance of unobserved heterogeneity among six
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hospital categories and addresses whether empirical results significantly depend on the
assumptions made for the production technology. Second, it determines whether theo-
retical expectations for cost savings can be confirmed in empirical analysis by relating
calculated inefficiency scores to the three payment systems. Estimates are derived by an
extended single-step approach of Battese and Coelli (1995).
The empirical analysis reveals two key results. First, with respect to model comparison,
the random parameter frontier model is more robust and has a higher explanatory power
than the single cost frontier model. Heterogeneity correction among hospital categories is
crucial in deriving meaningful inefficiency scores. Second, PPS are negatively correlated
with hospital cost inefficiency, particularly the payment per patient case system. Payment
systems designed to put hospitals at operating risk are more effective than retrospective
payment systems in containing hospital costs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview of
the different prospective and retrospective payment systems that coexisted in Switzerland
between 2004 and 2009. Section 4.3 outlines the standard and random parameter frontier
model and Section 4.4 describes the data used as well as the empirical specifications.
Finally, Section 4.5 presents the results of the cost frontier models and the determinants
of inefficiency.
4.2 Introduction to Swiss Hospital Financing
The Swiss health care system has been shaped by the country’s decentralized federal
structure, in which all 26 cantons are responsible for providing health care services to
their residents. The hospital sector is no exception. Cantonal authorities are responsible
for capacity planning and for the quality of hospital care. Provision is typically purchased
from hospitals that are qualified to provide health care to primary insured patients.
However, this does not imply that hospital financing only comes from cantonal sources.
On the contrary, health insurers pay an agreed amount of up to 50 percent of operating
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costs, resulting in a dual system where cantons cover the residual cost and investments
in infrastructure.1 Modes of financing can therefore differ among cantons.
Increasing health care costs have induced many cantons to revise their hospital pay-
ment system. Especially the implementation of the new federal law on social health care
insurance in 1994 (effective in 1996), where cantonal authorities were given legislative
power to control for hospital operating costs, has resulted in the coexistence of various
RPS and PPS in Switzerland (see Figure 4.1 for an overview of existing payment systems).
Figure 4.1: Swiss Payment Systems
Hospital Financing
Fee-For-Service
(Per Diem Payment)
Global Budget Payment per Case
Price per Clinic &
Per Diem Element
Price per DRG
Classification
Prior to 1996, cantons primarily used a retrospective cost-based per diem or fee-for-
service system to pay hospitals for their services. Remuneration was equal to reported
costs and bankruptcy was only possible if cantonal authorities decided to reduce over-
capacity. Unsurprisingly, critics of these schemes argued that there was little incentive
for cost containment. Hospitals could waste resources and increase health care costs in
order to obtain greater reimbursement. Hence, after 1996, several cantons experimented
with PPS to set incentives for cost containment. The two alternatives included a global
budget and a payment per patient case system (see second level in Figure 4.1). Under
a global budget system, hospitals are paid a fixed amount for a predetermined number
of admissions whether or not a patient seeks care during the accounting period. Under
a payment per patient case system, hospitals are paid a fixed amount per admission,
regardless of the actual cost. In both cases, hospitals obtain the gain or incur the loss,
1 Health care insurers might cover more than 50 percent of expenditures in privately owned hospitals,
which are not on the cantonal list. However, these are typically for-profit hospitals specializing in
supplementary insured patients.
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making them act to minimize costs. However, the incentive for cost minimization could
be weakened in the Swiss case because many cantons still do not firmly exclude a bailout.
This is especially the case in a global budget system, where hospitals are generally al-
lowed to renegotiate their budget for unexpected costs. Hospitals still have an implicit
deficit guaranty which reduces their operating risk and therefore the incentive for cost
minimization. Furthermore, the determination of the remuneration per admission could
also influence incentives for cost containment. Two variants are widely used in Switzer-
land (see third level in Figure 4.1). The first variant determines payments per admission
according to a clinic-specific average price and a per diem element to control for differ-
ences in the length of stay. The second variant uses a Swiss specification of the DRG2
classification system that attempts to classify patients into groups with similar usage of
resource. In contrast to the first variant, payments are independent of the length of stay.
Thus, hospitals have no incentives to maximize the length of stay, which should result in
additional cost savings. Even in a DRG system there is provision for additional payment
for those patients who are unusually expensive within the DRG classification, but these
outlier payments apply to only a small portion of patients and are not directly related to
length of stay.
An increasing number of cantons have changed to PPS. In 2004, only 38 percent of
all Swiss hospitals were still reimbursed by per diem payments. Most hospitals had PPS
and almost 36 percent of them already used DRG classifications. In 2007, the number of
hospitals with PPS increased even more and most cantons used DRG classifications (see
Meister, 2008). Unsurprisingly, in 2007 the Swiss parliament revised the insurance law to
introduce a DRG system in all cantons by 2012. Following the U.S. Medicare reform of
1983 and the German reform of 2004, policy makers believe that the new reimbursement
system would increase cost efficiency as outlined in the Introduction section. This article
aims to determine whether the DRG system is preferable to contain health care costs.
The hypotheses of interest are:
2 Diagnostic Related Group (DRG) is a diagnoses classification system, to distinguish between dif-
ferent requirements on hospital sources. DRG has first been used in the US health care program
for elderly people (Medicare,1983). In Switzerland, AP-DRG – a non-profit organization – so far
provided information to different diagnostic groups and their cost weights. In 20012, SwissDRG is
going to replace the AP-DRG system.
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1. Hospitals with PPS are more cost efficient than hospitals with RPS. Putting a
hospital at any amount of operating risk should strengthen incentives for cost min-
imization (lower cost inefficiency).
2. Hospitals with payments based on DRG classifications are more cost efficient than
those paid with a per diem element. The fact that DRG systems do not account for
longer length of stay should cause additional cost savings (lower cost inefficiency).
4.3 Estimation Models
In order to analyze these hypotheses, firm-specific inefficiency scores must first be estab-
lished from estimated cost frontiers.3 This paper applies two specifications to check for
the importance of unobserved heterogeneity among hospitals. The first specification is a
standard frontier model that was first implemented by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen
and van den Broeck (1977). It estimates inefficiency as the distance between a cost frontier
and observed expenditures. Observable heterogeneity is captured by shifting means of the
inefficiency term, similar to preliminary work by Battese and Coelli (1995), Huang and
Liu (1994), and Kumbhakar et al. (1991). The second specification is a random parame-
ter frontier model that additionally controls for unobserved heterogeneity in technology
parameters (for other applications see Orea and Kumbhakar, 2004 and Tsionas, 2002).
Inefficiency is estimated as cost deviations from category-specific cost frontiers.
4.3.1 The Standard Frontier Model (SFM)
The cost frontier for hospital i = 1, ..., N at time period t = 1, ..., T can be written as
Cit = C(Yit,Wit;α, β) +
εit︷ ︸︸ ︷
uit + vit, (4.1)
with Cit representing operating expenditures, Yit denoting the output vector, and Wit as
the vector of input prices. α is the intercept and β is a (K × 1) vector of unknown slope
parameters. C(Yit,Wit;α, β) is the deterministic part of the cost frontier that remains to
3 See Coelli et al. (2005) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for an overview of inefficiency measurement
methods.
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be specified for the empirical estimation. Typically, this is either a Cobb-Douglas or a
more flexible translog functional form.
The error term εit is split into two additive components, enabling deviations for random
noise, vit and cost inefficiency, uit. Random noise is normally distributed vit
iid∼ N [0, σ2v ]
with mean zero and variance σ2v . Firm-specific inefficiency uit is assumed to follow a
one-sided distribution supported on the interval [0,∞). The larger uit, the more cost
inefficient a hospital and the greater the potential for cost savings.
Since the main purpose of this paper is to analyze the influence of PPS on inefficiency,
inefficiency is specified congruent to Battese and Coelli (1995) as a truncated normal
distribution uit ∼ fN+ [u¯it, σ2u] with firm specific means u¯it and variance σ2u. In this article,
mean inefficiency is a linear function of l = 1, .., L explanatory variables Zit that influence
inefficiency,
u¯it = γo +
L∑
l=1
γlZlit + ςit, (4.2)
where γ is an (L× 1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated and ςit remains as
unexplained hospital-specific inefficiency.
4.3.2 The Random Parameter Frontier Model (RPFM)
One way to extend the SFM for unobserved heterogeneity is the random parameter
frontier model, which estimates inefficiency scores from individual cost frontiers.4 In this
article, the model accounts for j = 1, ..., J exogenously given hospital categories that are
expected to have different production technologies,
Cit = C(Yit,Wit;αj, βj) +
εit︷ ︸︸ ︷
uit + vit,
uit ∼ fN+ [u¯it, σ2u], u¯it = γo +
L∑
l=1
γlZlit + ςit,
αj = α + wj,
βj = β + wj. (4.3)
4 It is worth mentioning that a separation is not preferable in every case. If technology is manageable
than the choice of an inferior technology could be treated as inefficiency.
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Different from SFM, this specification allows inefficiency to be disentangled from unob-
servable heterogeneity with category-specific intercepts αj = α+wj and slope parameters
βj = β + wj. All time-invariant and firm-specific heterogeneity is captured in wj, which
is a [(K + 1)× 1] vector of random variables.
This paper specifies αj and βj similar to Tsionas (2002) as a multivariate normal
distribution
(
αj
βj
)
∼ fMN
[(
α¯
β¯
)
,Σ
]
, with Σ ∼ fW
 σ2α σα,β
σα,β σ
2
β
 , (4.4)
where α¯ ∼ N [0, σ2α¯] and β¯ ∼ N [0, σ2β¯] are both normally distributed with mean zero and
variance (σ2u, σ
2
v). This is a hierarchical model that first measures the mean effects (α¯, β¯)
and then estimates individual effects (αj, βj) for each parameter. Σ is Wishart distributed
with a [(K+1)× (K+1)] positive definite covariance matrix S = (σ2α, σ2β, σα,β), denoting
unobserved heterogeneity among hospitals. For Σ = 0 no variation exists and the RPFM
simplifies to a SFM.
Based on the distributional assumptions made in the SFM and RPFM, Bayesian econo-
metrics is applied for the simultaneous estimation of the parameters in the cost frontier
and the inefficiency term. This is superior to the frequently applied classical maximum
likelihood statistics since it considers unknown parameters as random variables, speci-
fied as prior distributions. Exact small sample results are possible because of the prior
information included. Estimation is performed using R and WINBUGS. Corresponding
Bayesian specifications and programming codes are described in the Appendix.
4.4 Data and Econometric Specifications
4.4.1 The Sample
Data used in this study were provided by the annual reports of the federal office of
public health and by the conference of cantonal health ministers. They include 333 Swiss
hospitals for the time period of 2004 to 2009, consisting of 5 university hospitals, 23
central hospitals, 27 large regional hospitals, 46 medium regional hospitals, 46 small
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regional hospitals, 28 specialized surgery hospitals, and sundry hospitals, viz. psychiatric
and rehabilitation clinics. In total, 127 of the 333 hospitals are private and not subsidized.
In the interest of comparability, the entire data set was reviewed and assessed for the
presence of any missing data and outliers that could distort the results. Furthermore,
the sundry category and all non-subsidized hospitals were discarded. An unbalanced
panel consisting of 545 observations from six different hospital categories with sufficient
quality was finally analyzed. In Table 4.1, the variables are listed together with descriptive
statistics.
Table 4.1: Definition and Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Analysis
Variable Definition Mean Min Max
V C Variable operational expense (V C)1) 135,621 8,550 1,015,756
Y1 No. of inpatient cases, CMI-adjusted (CASES) 9,113 502 52,143
Y2 Revenue from outpatients (OUTP )
1) 27,418 0 223,937
PL Labor input price (PL)1) 101 34 146
PM Price of other production inputs (PM)1) 4 2 7
K No. of beds (BEDS) 229 31 1,169
S1 No. of internship categories (INTERN) 22 0 134
S2 No. of specialties (SPEC) 39 4 106
Z1 Dummy= 1 for prospective payment systems (PPS)
2) 78 0 100
Z2 Dummy= 1 for payments per patient case (CASEP )
2) 14 0 100
Z3 Dummy= 1 for global budgets (GLOB)
2) 64 0 100
Z4 Dummy= 1 for DRG classifications (DRG)
2) 51 0 100
Tt Year dummies, t = 2005 to 2009 (base year is 2004)
1) in 1,000 CHF, 1 CHF=0.8 USD (2004 exchange rates).
2) in percent, PPS=78 in column three means that on average 78 percent of all hospitals have
PPS.
4.4.2 Specification of the Cost Frontier
With these data, a variable Cobb-Douglas cost frontier (subscripts i = 1, ..., N and t =
1, ..., T are dropped for simplicity) can be specified as
ln
V C
PM
= α +
2∑
m=1
βmlnYm + β3ln
PL
PM
+ β4lnK +
2∑
l=1
βlSl +
5∑
t=1
βtTt + u+ v, (4.5)
where variable cost (V C) depends on two output categories (Y ), one input price for labor
(PL), one price for other production inputs (PM), one capital stock (K), two structural
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variables (S), and five time dummies (T ) to control for any unobserved dynamics over
time (base year 2004). Normalizing V C and PL by PM imposes linear homogeneity in
input prices.
Health care output – change in health status – is difficult to measure directly for
Swiss hospitals. In this article, measures for inpatient care CASES and outpatient care
OUTP serve as intermediate outputs. To adjust for severity in inpatient care, CMI-
adjusted admissions are used. Outpatient care is approximated by ambulatory earnings,
similar to Farsi et al. (2006) and Biorn et al. (2003). Furthermore, input price PL is
calculated as labor expense divided by the number of full time employees. Input price
PM aggregates all the remaining inputs, such as energy, material, and purchased services
that cannot be distinguished due to data limitations. An approximate price for PM is
calculated as residual cost divided by the number of admissions (a discussion of this
common simplification is given in Coelli et al., 2005, ch. 5). Since capital stock (total
fixed assets) is hardly measurable, BEDS serve as an approximation. Finally, the number
of internship categories INTERN and specialties SPEC control for observable service
heterogeneity among hospitals.
The formulation can be justified on several grounds. First, it is compatible with short-
term cost minimization, reflecting the fact that capital (indicated by BEDS) is a pre-
determined rather than a decision variable. In Switzerland, cantonal hospital planning
divisions mainly decide capacity. Second, the exclusion of user cost of capital from the
equation avoids measurement errors since values would have to be imputed because most
hospitals are not charged capital user costs.
4.4.3 Determinants of Inefficiency
Since the influence of PPS on inefficiency is the focus of this article, additional explana-
tory variables are included in the inefficiency term – see eq. (4.2) – to test for the two
hypotheses from Section 4.2:
(1) Hospitals with PPS are more cost efficient than hospitals with RPS;
(2) Hospitals with payments based on DRG classifications are more cost efficient than
those paid with a per diem element.
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Hypothesis (1) is tested with two models. Model (1) refers to eq. (4.6),
u¯it = γo + γ1PPS + γ2PPS:DRG+ ςit, (4.6)
which relates mean inefficiency to a dummy variable that equals one for hospitals with
PPS and zero for hospitals with RPS. It determines whether PPS – either a global budget
or a payment per patient case system – is more effective than the retrospective alternative.
Model (2) refers to eq. (4.7),
u¯it = γo + γ1CASEP + γ2GLOB + γ3CASEP :DRG+ γ4GLOB:DRG+ ςit, (4.7)
which is a refinement of Model (1). It checks for the unique effects of a global budget
and a payment per patient case system. Therefore, the variable PPS is replaced by two
dummy variables, GLOB, for hospitals with a global budget, and CASEP , for hospitals
with payments per patient case. Hospitals with a retrospective per diem system form the
control group. In Model (2), it is expected (from Section 4.2) that hospitals receiving
payments per patient case are more cost efficient (have lower inefficiency scores) since
most hospitals with global budgets have a partial deficit guaranty.
Hypothesis (2) calls for the introduction of an additional dummy variable, DRG, in
eqs. (4.6) and (4.7), which is specified as a nested interaction term. It measures the
supplementary effect of DRG classifications relative to the alternative specification with
a per diem element. As outlined in Section 4.2, payments based on a per diem element
can reduce incentives for cost minimization since hospitals have incentive to increase the
length of stay. Therefore, it is expected that hospitals with DRG, which is free from any
adjustment for length of stay, are more efficient (have lower inefficiency scores) than the
frequently applied alternative.
Additionally, Model (3)checks for the hypothesis (2) with eq. (4.8),
u¯it = γo + γ1PPS + γ2PPS:DRG+ γ3PPS:DRG1 + γ4PPS:DRG2 + ςit. (4.8)
This is a refinement of Model (1) for a possible catch-up effect of DRG over time. There-
fore, two additional dummies DRGj, j = 1, 2 are included, where j indicates the time
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lag from the initiation of the reimbursement scheme. Since it is possible that DRG only
becomes effective a few years after initiation, it is preferable to test for these effects as
well.
4.5 Empirical Results
This section first presents estimates of the technology parameters and inefficiency scores
with a special focus on the influence of unobserved heterogeneity. Second, in Section 4.5.2,
the influence of PPS is discussed for the three models outlined in Section 4.4.3.
To obtain posterior estimates, Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) algorithms were
run for 20,000 iterations and the first 10,000 samples were discarded as a burn-in phase.
Different assumptions for priors and starting values converged to roughly the same values
without strong periodicities or tendencies in the trace plot. Furthermore, the Monte Carlo
error is very low. All cost frontier parameters and inefficiency scores have a Monte Carlo
error lower than 7.02∗10−4, indicating that the results are quite precise and have reached
the equilibrium distribution.
4.5.1 Cost Frontier Estimates and Inefficiency Scores
Table 4.2 shows the estimates of the technology parameters of the variable cost frontier
from eq. (4.5) after an analysis of cost drivers together with tests for endogeneity, het-
eroscedasticity, and the skewness of the composite error term were performed. Hospital
output could be endogenous in the RPS when hospitals have incentive to increase their
output due to higher remuneration. However, a Hausman test did not suggest rejection
of the exogeneity assumption. Heteroscedasticity was also not a problem according to
a Breusch-Pagan test. Only INTERN had a weak effect on the variance of the com-
posite error term. Finally, because inefficient hospitals by definition lie above the cost
frontier, a positively skewed composite error term is required for efficiency measurement.
Otherwise, no inefficiency would exist and OLS would be sufficient to estimate the cost
frontier. However, residuals of the cost driver analysis were positively skewed, indicating
that inefficiency does exist in the Swiss hospital sector.
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In the SFM, the first three columns of Table 4.2 contain the estimation mean, the
2.5, and 97.5 percentile of the technology parameters. They satisfy economic conditions
in that the cost frontier monotonically increases in the outputs CASES and OUTP as
well as in the input price PL. The only exception is hospital beds (BEDS = 0.22). Since
it is an indicator of capital stock, it should have a negative sign (see Kumbhakar and
Lovell, 2000). However, because hospital capacity (no. of hospital beds) is exogenously
determined by the cantonal authority, the expected substitution effect could be very small.
Furthermore, because BEDS is a poor proxy for capital stock, which is highly correlated
with hospital output, estimates might show an output rather than a substitution effect
(see e.g. Filippini et al., 2004 for similar difficulties). Consequently, an investigation of the
shadow price is not possible, but inefficiency scores are still derivable. Moreover, variable
costs tend to shift up systematically over time, with a maximum in 2009 (T09 = 0.036).
Finally, with regard to service heterogeneity it is not surprising that internship categories
(INTERN = 0.002) and the number of specialties (SPEC = 0.001) have a positive
effect. Variable cost increases with the number of different services offered.
Table 4.2: Econometric Results for the SFM and RPFM, Years 2004-09
Variables1) SFM RPFM
Mean 2.50% 97.50% Mean 2.50% 97.50% SD2)
Constant -0.088 -0.103 -0.073 -0.123 -0.201 -0.059 0.074
CASES 0.744 0.708 0.781 0.592 0.359 0.768 0.224
OUTP 0.004 -0.002 0.011 0.076 -0.045 0.217 0.158
PL 0.382 0.347 0.418 0.434 0.286 0.612 0.169
BEDS 0.220 0.182 0.258 0.281 0.118 0.482 0.159
INTERN 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.001
SPEC 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001
T09 0.036 0.008 0.065 0.017 -0.014 0.045 0.019
T08 0.023 -0.005 0.051 0.007 -0.013 0.031 0.009
T07 0.012 -0.016 0.040 0.002 -0.016 0.024 0.008
T06 0.023 -0.005 0.051 0.009 -0.011 0.032 0.009
T05 0.009 -0.017 0.034 0.004 -0.015 0.028 0.011
σu 0.013 0.009 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.003
σv 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.002 0.004
DIC -1106 -1596
Obs. 545 545
1) Variable cost (V C) is the dependent variable. Determinants of inefficiency are shown separately in
Table 4.3.
2) SD estimates reveal the diagonal of the covariance matrix Σ of eq. (4.4).
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Estimates for the RPFM only have slightly different values [estimation means are rep-
resented by β¯ of eq. (4.4)]. However, the results in the last column suggest that there
is a fair amount of variation in the frontier model parameters. Estimates reveal the
diagonal of the covariance matrix Σ of eq. (4.4), which can be interpreted as the varia-
tion in the parameters across hospital categories. Heterogeneity is highest for inpatient
care (CASES = 0.224), followed by the input price for labor (PL = 0.169), capital
stock (BEDS = 0.159), and outpatient care (OUTP = 0.158). It is remarkable that
even though heterogeneity in inpatient care is already adjusted for by a casemix index,
indisputable variation remains among hospital categories (see Section 3.3.1 for similar
findings). This raises doubts about the relevance of the DRG classifications to control
for cost variability in inpatient care. However, in order to determine whether the greater
flexibility of the RPFM is indicated by the data, both models are assessed by the DIC
information criteria shown in Table 4.2 (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). The lower the DIC-
value, the better the goodness of fit of the estimated cost frontier, indicating that the
RPFM (DIC = −1596) has better fit than the SFM (DIC = −1106). The SFM seems
to be too restrictive for Switzerland. More flexible variants are needed to capture all the
existing heterogeneity among hospital categories.
For the present study, the more important question is the impact of unobserved het-
erogeneity on the estimated inefficiency scores. This is shown in the density and scatter
plots in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Figure 4.2 shows the inefficiency scores of the SFM and the
RPFM. Figure 4.3 presents preliminary indications of the influence of PPS.
As shown in Figure 4.2, there are strong differences across the two models. Unob-
served heterogeneity increases estimated inefficiency scores, potentially resulting in the
overstatement of cost reduction (Figure 4.2 panel A). The mean inefficiency score of the
SFM is 0.066, meaning that Swiss hospitals could on average reduce 7 percent of their
variable costs. However, using the RPFM, mean inefficiency reduces to about 5 percent.
Approximately 2 percent of the SFM scores can be detected as unobserved heterogeneity.
A comparison of the individual scores in panel B is even more revealing. Although both
models have a high correlation of 0.75, hospitals are systematically measured as more
inefficient in the SFM. In particular, hospitals that would have been rated highly inef-
ficient in the SFM gain ground when the RPFM is applied. The maximum inefficiency
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Figure 4.2: Estimated Inefficiency Scores of the SFM and RPFM, Years 2004-9
A) Density of the Inefficiency Scores
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Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
SFM 0.066 0.019 0.294 0.039 2.277 10.851
RPFM 0.049 0.015 0.157 0.024 1.417 5.364
score decreases from 0.294 for the SFM to 0.157 for the RPFM, putting the maximum
cost reduction at about 16 percent. At a given point in time and for the majority of
Swiss hospitals, it clearly matters whether or not unobserved heterogeneity is taken into
account.
It is noteworthy that even the SFM reveals significant lower average inefficiency scores
than in previous studies to Swiss hospitals (see Widmer et al., 2011, Farsi and Filippini,
2006, and Steinmann and Zweifel, 2003). Compared to Widmer et al. (2011), the SFM
inefficiency scores drop from 11 percent to approximately 7 percent. However, since only
public financed hospitals are used in this study, differences can be seen as an indication
for cost variability between private and public hospitals.
Next, Figure 4.3 reveals some preliminary indications for the effectiveness of PPS.
Surprisingly, even though SFM scores are indisputably biased, both models come up with
comparable conclusions that PPS reduces hospital cost inefficiency. In the SFM, mean
inefficiency decreases from 0.073 to 0.064 (Figure 4.3 panel A). In the RPFM, mean
inefficiency scores decrease from 0.053 to 0.047 Figure (4.3 panel B). Both reductions are
significant according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (the hypothesis that mean inefficiency
is equal for the two groups can be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level). However,
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Figure 4.3: Estimated Inefficiency Scores by Model Type, Years 2004-9
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the decrease in inefficiency is larger in the SFM (mean = −0.009) than in the RPFM
(mean = −0.006).
4.5.2 Sources of Inefficiency
Given the encouraging results in the preceding section, further analysis of the influence
of PPS on inefficiency is warranted to test for the hypotheses of Section 4.2. Table 4.3
presents estimation results for the three models outlined in Section 4.4.3. The dependent
variable is the mean inefficiency u¯it of eq. (4.2). All results are estimated together with
the parameters of the cost frontier, shown in Table 4.2 for Model (1).5
In Model (1), an unexpected positive sign is obtained for PPS in the SFM (mean
= 0.02), indicating that PPS increases hospital inefficiency. In contrast, the more appro-
priate RPFM shows a small negative value (mean = −0.01). This is rather counterintu-
itive to the findings in Figure 4.3, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity substantively
biases estimates of the influence of PPS on inefficiency. Estimates for the interaction term
PPS:DRG are more intuitive. In both cases, DRG is negatively correlated with hospi-
5 Technology parameters of Model (2) and (3) are not shown. They are found to be comparable to
those discussed in Section 4.5.1.
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Inefficiency by Model Type, Years 2004-9
Variables1) SFM RPFM
Mean 2.5% 97.5% Mean 2.5% 97.5%
Model 1:
Constant -0.13 -0.31 0.01 -0.17 -0.35 -0.04
PPS 0.02 -0.09 0.12 -0.01 -0.15 0.09
PPS:DRG -0.15 -0.31 -0.04 -0.08 -0.22 0.02
Model 2:
Constant -0.15 -0.35 -0.01 -0.17 -0.33 -0.05
CASEP -0.08 -0.30 0.13 -0.07 -0.26 0.11
GLOB 0.03 -0.07 0.14 0.00 -0.13 0.10
CASEP:DRG -0.06 -0.29 0.14 -0.04 -0.24 0.15
GLOB:DRG -0.15 -0.32 -0.03 -0.07 -0.22 0.03
Model 3:
Constant -0.16 -0.36 -0.03 -0.19 -0.36 -0.06
PPS 0.02 -0.11 0.13 -0.02 -0.16 0.09
PPS:DRG -0.13 -0.33 0.03 -0.08 -0.25 0.07
PPS:DRG1 -0.08 -0.29 0.10 -0.03 -0.21 0.14
PPS:DRG2 -0.01 -0.25 0.18 -0.02 -0.19 0.15
1) Mean inefficiency u¯it is the dependent variable in each model. Technology parameters are dropped for
simplicity; those of Model (1) are shown in Table 4.2.
tal inefficiency. However, the effect is unreasonably large in the SFM (mean = −0.15).
Estimates for Model (2) are similar. Although both approaches have comparable signs,
estimates for GLOB and GLOB:DRG differ significantly between the two approaches.
In the SFM, GLOB is found to have a positive influence (mean = 0.03) on inefficiency
and no effect in the RPFM (mean = 0.00). Moreover, the interaction term indicates an
unreasonably high negative effect (mean = −0.15) in the SFM. Even in Model (3), which
controls for a possible time-lag of DRG, the estimated effects are systematically larger in
the SFM and again PPS seems to be significantly biased by unobserved heterogeneity.
Taken together, estimation results are less robust between the SFM and RPFM than
expected from Figure 4.3. The results mainly depend on the assumptions made to the
production technology.
Nevertheless, RPS appears to undermine efforts for cost containment, addressing hy-
pothesis (1). Inefficiency decreases by about −0.01 for hospitals with PPS, meaning that
a switch to PPS causes hospitals to reduce their variable costs by an average of 1 per-
cent. However, as shown in Model (2), efficiency gains depend substantially on whether
hospitals are paid by a global budget or receive payments per patient case. While a pay-
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ment per patient case system reduces hospital-specific inefficiency by about −0.07 on
average, no efficiency gains occur with a global budget system (in the biased SFM they
are even more inefficient, 0.03). The renegotiations that most cantons still allow of the
global budget seem to reduce incentives for cost minimization.
Whereas general remuneration settings with a per diem element can be used to un-
necessarily keep a patient in the hospital, a DRG system strengthens incentives for cost
minimization. As estimates from Table 4.3 show, this results in 8 percent lower cost in-
efficiency for hospitals with a DRG system, addressing hypothesis (2). Model (2), which
shows the unique effects of DRG for hospitals with a global budget and payments per
patient case system, reveals that the efficiency gains of DRG are even larger in the global
budget (−0.07) than in the payment per patient case system (−0.04). However, the com-
bined effect of CASEP is larger (−0.11 = −0.07− 0.04) than the expected cost savings
for GLOB (−0.07 = 0.00− 0.07), making the payment per patient case system together
with DRG classifications the preferable variant for Switzerland. Under a payment per
patient case system with DRG classifications, hospitals have 11 percent lower inefficiency
scores on average than their counterparts with RPS. Moreover, Model (3) reveals that
a DRG system is not fully effective in the first year after initiation. Although most cost
savings occur in the first year (DRG = −0.08), additional reduction is observable in the
second (DRG1 = −0.03) and third year (DRG2 = −0.02) after implementation.
Finally, these findings are in line with the theoretical expectations, for example outlined
in Chalkley and Malcomson (2000) and Newhouse (1996). With respect to the hospital
payment reform becoming effective in 2012, these results support the policy expectations
that PPS will rather increase cost efficiency. However, the implementation has to be fully
prospective and preclude any bailouts.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this article was to estimate the effectiveness of prospective payment sys-
tems in reducing hospital cost inefficiency. Hospitals in Switzerland are analyzed, which,
in contrast to previous studies, enables a comparison of a retrospective per diem system
with two prospective payment systems, one based on a global budget and another based
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on payments per patient case. Since the results of previous studies may have been affected
by the existence of unobserved heterogeneity, two stochastic frontier models are used to
control for potential bias. The first is a standard frontier model (SFM) that assumes a
homogeneous technology for all hospitals. The second one is a random parameter frontier
model (RPFM) that controls for unobserved heterogeneity with hospital group-specific
intercepts and slope parameters. A variable cost frontier is estimated for approximately
90 public financed Swiss hospitals during the time period of 2004 to 2009.
There are two main results from this analysis. First, a comparison of the standard and
random parameter frontier models reveals that heterogeneity is substantial between Swiss
hospital categories. Inefficiency scores are biased upwards by two percent on average in
the SFM. The maximum inefficiency score decreases from 0.294 in the SFM to 0.157 in the
RPFM, putting the maximum cost savings at approximately 16 percent. Further analysis
of the determinants of inefficiency shows that unobserved heterogeneity systematically
varies among hospitals, indicating that the SFM is not able to detect the true effect of
prospective payment systems on inefficiency. The assumptions made for the production
technology (SFM vs. RPFM) are important in the Swiss case.
Second, prospective payment systems are associated with an increase in hospital cost
efficiency, particularly for the payment per patient case system. Payment systems de-
signed to put hospitals at operating risk seem to be more effective in reducing hospital
costs than retrospective payment systems. However, these effects may be diminished if
cantons do not firmly preclude a bailout. Results relating to the global budget system re-
veal that if hospitals can obtain higher budgets to cover past errors, then the incentive for
cost minimization disappears. In addition, the settings for the remuneration per admis-
sion are also important. Whereas general remuneration settings with a per diem element
can be used to unnecessarily keep a patient in the hospital, a DRG system strength-
ens incentives for cost minimization. Nonetheless, estimates show that DRG is not fully
effective after initiation. Additional efficiency gains occur later on, although these are
smaller in the third year than in the second year. Therefore, these empirical findings are
in line with the theoretical expectations. With respect to the hospital payment reform
effective in 2012, these results support the expectations of Swiss politicians that the new
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payment system can contain hospital costs. However, the implementation has to be fully
prospective and has to preclude any bailouts.
This analysis is not without limitations. Above all, unobserved heterogeneity is esti-
mated as a time-invariant random variable, meaning that all time-invariant random noise
is measured as heterogeneity. Since inefficiency could be time-invariant as well, estimates
to the RPFM underestimate inefficiency. Nevertheless, together with the SFM, which
overestimates inefficiency, the true influence of PPS must lie somewhere between, mak-
ing the results still reliable. Additionally, a translog form would have been more accurate
than the Cobb-Douglas form for the production technology since it can test for specific
features of technology (like economies of scale or homotheticity) by examining the esti-
mated model parameters. Unfortunately, limitations of the data dictated the application
of the reduced self-dual Cobb-Douglas form, which per definition is restricted to constant
elasticities of substitution and is constant in economies of scale. Thus, estimates might
be biased in cases when these assumptions are not reasonable. In spite of this limita-
tion, the analysis not only identifies the effect of PPS on inefficiency, it also outlines the
importance of unobserved heterogeneity in deriving unbiased inefficiency scores.
Does Prospective Payment Increase Hospital (In)Efficiency? 85
Appendix: The Bayesian Specification
This paper uses Bayesian statistics to estimate eqs. (4.1) and (4.3). Inference is made
from a posterior distribution p(θ|X) of the unknown parameters (summarized as θ) given
the observed data (summarized as X). According to the Bayesian rule this is
p(θ|X) = L(X|θ)p(θ)
p(X)
∝ p(θ)L(X|θ), (4.9)
expressed as the product of the prior information p(θ) and the likelihood L(X|θ), respec-
tively.
For the estimates in Section 4.5, the posterior distribution for the SFM is specified as
p(α, β, u, γ, σ−2v , σ
−2
u ;C, Y,W,Z) ∝ p(α, β, γ, σ−2v , σ−2u )
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
p(u, γ, σ−2u |Z)
×
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
1√
2piσ2v
exp
[
− 1
2σ2v
(Cit − [C(Yit,Wit;α, β) + uit])2
]
, (4.10)
where p(α, β, γ, σ−2v , σ−2u ) are probability distributions of the unknown parameters. The likeli-
hood function in eq. (4.10) is as in Griffin and Steel (2007), normally distributed with σ2v as the
variance of the random noise vit = Cit− [C(Yit,Wit;α, β) +uit]. This is a gain in flexibility over
classical maximum likelihood applications, where a joint density function of the random noise
and the inefficiency term is specified. Here, only random noise enters the likelihood function.
Inefficiency is estimated hierarchically as a latent variable along with the other parameters of
the cost frontier.
Turning to the RPFM the posterior is given by
p(α, α¯, β, β¯, u, γ,Σ, σ−2v , σ
−2
u ;C, Y,W,Z) ∝ p(α¯, β¯, γ,Σ, σ−2v , σ−2u )
×
J∏
j=1
(2pi)−K/2|Σ|−1/2exp
[
−1
2
((
αj
βj
)
−
(
α¯
β¯
))′
Σ−1
((
αj
βj
)
−
(
α¯
β¯
))]
×
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
1√
2piσ2v
exp
[
− 1
2σ2v
(Cit − [C(Yit,Wit;αj , βj) + uit])2
]
×
N∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
p(u, γ, σ−2u |Z). (4.11)
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Again, the likelihood function is specified as a normal distribution and inefficiency is es-
timated as a latent variable together with the other unknown parameters. Different is the
specification of the random intercept αj and the slope parameters βj , which are estimated at
two levels. At the first level, overall influences on hospital costs (α¯, β¯) are determined, cor-
responding to the first factor following the proportionally sign of eq. (4.11). The second-level
estimates of the individual effects (αj , βj) defined in eq. (4.4) are derived from the multivariate
normal distribution shown in eq. (4.11).
In contrast to classical statistics, an application of Bayesian statistics requires additional
information for the prior distributions of the unknown parameters, since all parameters are
considered as random variables. They should comprise all information available before any data
are involved in the statistical analysis. In this case, the values for the hyperparameters are
chosen in a way to imply relatively vague but proper priors. In particular, the priors for the
SFM and RPFM are assumed to be independent,
p(α, β, γ, σ−2v , σ
−2
u ) = p(α)p(β)p(γ)p(σ
−2
v )p(σ
−2
u ) (4.12)
p(α¯, β¯, γ,Σ, σ−2v , σ
−2
u ) = p(α¯)p(β¯)p(γ)p(Σ)p(σ
−2
v )p(σ
−2
u ) (4.13)
Here, p(α) = fN [0, θα], p(α¯) = fN [0, θα¯], p(β) = fN [0, θβ], p(β¯) = fN [0, θβ¯] have a normal
distribution with mean zero and a diffuse prior for their corresponding precision θ. The precision
of the likelihood function has a gamma distribution p(σ−2v ) = fG[µ, θσ−2v ] with diffuse shape and
scale parameters. Inefficiency is assumed to be truncated normally distributed p(u, γ, σ−2u |Z) =
f+N [γZ, σ
−2
u ] with σ
−2
u = fG[5, (5 ∗ log(r¯)2)] and p(γ) = fN [0, θγ ]/
√
fG[5, (5 ∗ log(r¯)2)]. This
specification is in line with Griffin and Steel (2007) and Koop et al. (1997), permitting to
impose a priori information with regard to mean efficiency, eff = exp(−u). Following the
formulation of Griffin and Steel (2007), eff = 0.875 is assumed for prior efficiency. Finally,
the precision of the random parameters is specified as a Wishart distribution p(Σ) = fW [S] in
accordance with eq. (4.11) with diffuse prior for the covariance matrix S.
Finally, note that estimates of the unknown parameters can be derived by the marginal
posteriors of eqs. (4.10) and (4.11). However, it is not always possible to compute the posteriors
analytically. Therefore, iterative Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) simulation is used, which
involves iterative sampling from posterior parameter densities. Here, we use WINBUGS to derive
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the estimates (see Ntzoufras, 2009 for an introduction). The corresponding computational codes
for the SFM and RPFM are shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Computation Codes for the Standard Frontier and the Random Parameter
Frontier Model
Standard Frontier Model Random Parameter Frontier Model
model{ model{
for ( it in 1:NT ){ for( it in 1:NT ){
firm[it] ← n[it,1] firm[it] ← n[it,1]
typ[it] ← n[it,3]
Likelihood: Likelihood:
Y[it] ∼ dnorm(mu[it], prec) Y[it] ∼ dnorm(mu[it], prec)
mu[it] ← inprod(b[1:K+1], X[it, 1:K+1]) mu[it] ← inprod(b[typ[it],1:K+1], X[it,1:K+1])
+ u[it] + u[it]
} }
Priors: Priors:
for (it in 1:NT) { for (it in 1:NT) {
u[it] ∼ djl.dnorm.trunc(mu1[it],lambda,0,1000) u[it] ∼ djl.dnorm.trunc(mu1[it],lambda,0,1000)
mu1[it] ← inprod(t[1:L+1], Z[it,1:L+1]) mu1[it] ← inprod(t[1:L+1], Z[it,1:L+1])
} }
for(j in 1:J){
for(k in 1:K+1){
b[j,k]← xi.b[j]*b.raw[j,k ]
}
b.raw[j,1:K+1] ∼ dmnorm(b.bar.raw[],b.tau.raw[,])
}
for (k in 1:K+1) { for(k in 1:K+1){
b[k] ∼ dnorm(0, 0.0001) b.bar[k] ← xi.b[k]*b.bar.raw[k]
b.bar.raw[k] ∼ dnorm(0,0.0001)
xi.b[k] ∼ dunif(-10,10)
} }
for(l in 1:L+1){ for(l in 1:L+1){
t[l] ← gamma[l] / sqrt(lambda) t[l] ← gamma[l] / sqrt(lambda)
gamma[l] ∼ dnorm(0.0, 1) gamma[l] ∼ dnorm(0.0, 1)
} }
lambda0 ← 5*log(r¯)*log(r¯) lambda0 ← 5 * log(r¯) * log(r¯)
lambda ∼ dgamma(5,lambda0) lambda ∼ dgamma(5,lambda0)
prec ∼ dgamma(0.1,0.01) prec ∼ dgamma(0.1,0.01)
b.tau.raw[1:K+1,1:K+1] ∼ dwish(S[1:K+1, 1:K+1], nu)
nu ← K+1
Sigma.B.raw[1:K+1,1:K+1] ← Inverse (b.tau.raw[,])
for(k in 1:K+1){
Sigma.B[k] ← abs(xi.b[k])* sqrt(Sigma.B.raw[,])
}
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Abstract: This study applies financial portfolio theory to determine efficient frontiers
in the provision of electricity for the United States and Switzerland. Expected returns are
defined by the rate of productivity increase of power generation (adjusted for external
costs), volatility, by its standard deviation. Since unobserved productivity shocks are
found to be correlated, Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) is used
to filter out the systematic component of the covariance matrix of the productivity
changes. Results suggest that as of 2003, the feasible maximum expected return (MER)
electricity portfolio for the United States contains more Coal, Nuclear, and Wind than
actual but markedly less Gas and Oil. The minimum variance (MV) portfolio contains
markedly more Oil, again more Coal, Nuclear, and Wind but almost no Gas. Regardless
of the choice between MER and MV, U.S. utilities are found to lie substantially inside
the efficient frontier. This is even more true of their Swiss counterparts, likely due to
continuing regulation of electricity markets.6
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5Efficient Provision of Electricity for the United
States and Switzerland
5.1 Introduction
Like most industrial countries, the United States and Switzerland face great challenges in
the provision of electricity arising from dwindling domestic resources. Both countries are
expected to confront substantial shortfalls during the next twenty years. According to the
U.S. National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPG), the projected gap amounts
to nearly 50 percent of 2020 demand. As for Switzerland, a study conducted by the Paul
Scherrer Institute (PSI) estimates a shortfall of 20 percent by 2020 (Gantner et al., 2000).
The solutions available to the two countries are the same, viz. import more power
(from Canada and France, respectively) or increase domestic supply by investing in new
generating technologies. Especially with the latter strategy, there is a substantial interest
in providing electricity as economically as possible. Therefore, the question of this paper
is, can the United States and Switzerland improve efficiency in their provision of electric-
ity? If so, what are the attractive technologies, taking into account external costs that
sooner or later will be factored into electricity prices?
For the measurement of efficiency, Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) and Data En-
velopment Analysis (DEA) are the two dominant alternatives. Fundamentally, both ap-
proaches assume a uniform production technology to infer the efficient use of a technology
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from observed choices of input and output quantities by firms. However, these approaches
only work well when productive units are homogenous with regard to technology and face
stable input prices and hence little uncertainty (see e.g. Greene, 2004a). In the provision
of electricity, these circumstances are not satisfied for at least two reasons.
1. Heterogenous technologies: Each power plant has its own type of technology, de-
pending on its primary energy source (Coal, Gas, Hydro, Nuclear, Oil, Wind).
The issue therefore is not the cost-minimizing use of one common technology but
determining an optimal portfolio of electricity-generating technologies.
2. Cost uncertainty: Exogenous shocks (e.g. the Gulf war in the case of oil) cause
unexpected changes in input prices which affect the level and development of unit
cost.
Therefore, it is not sufficient to merely focus on least-cost provision of electricity; in
view of a portfolio of technologies with uncertain cost characteristics, the optimal mix of
technology becomes the issue.
Such a mix can be determined by applying mean-variance portfolio theory (see e.g.
Kienzle and Andersson, 2008, Krey, 2008, Awerbuch, 2006, Yu, 2003, Berger et al., 2003,
Humphreys and McClain, 1998, and Bar-Lev and Katz, 1976). Here, a social planner (e.g.
federal government) is assumed to act like a financial investor, who hedges against the ups
and downs of the market by holding a diversified portfolio of securities. In contrast to a
least-cost strategy, capacity planning does not only reflect productivity but also risk at a
given level of productivity. Indeed, the objectives of the U.S. NEPG support the portfolio
approach to electricity advocated here (see NEPG, 2004). The methodological innovation
of this paper consists in recognizing that there are common shocks impinging on the pro-
duction frontiers and hence the development of productivity1 in generating technologies.
Taking this correlation into account in the estimation of the covariance matrix (using
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation, SURE) can give rise to important gains in
1 From an investor perspective, rates of return associated with a particular generating technology are
decisive. However, the available data do not permit to track price-cost margins. As a proxy, relative
productivity changes will be used, which reflect relative unit cost changes (but have the advantage
of being positively defined in the case of development.)
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the efficiency of estimation. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, SURE has not been
applied yet to the calculation of efficient electricity portfolios.
A comparison between the United States and Switzerland is of interest for several rea-
sons. First, both countries heavily rely on imported fuels (Gas and Nuclear, respectively)
for their power generation. While they can purchase primary energy sources at market
prices, there are differences in their technology mix, giving rise to the question of whether
this reflects differences in efficiency. Second, insights may be expected with regard to reg-
ulation. Contrary to the United States, the Swiss electricity market continues to be highly
regulated. Swiss voters rejected liberalization efforts in a popular referendum at the end
of 2002 (see EMG, 2000 and EMV, 2002). The usual presumption would be that U.S.
power generation is closer to the efficient frontier than its Swiss counterpart. Finally, sev-
eral countries (notably China and India) have to meet a rapidly increasing demand for
electricity. For them, it is of considerable importance to invest in energy sources in a way
that avoids inefficiency. This contribution should provide some help towards achieving
that objective.
Results show that returns and volatilities differ greatly between technologies and be-
tween SURE and OLS estimates. While optimal choice depends on risk aversion (which
is not known), the maximum expected return (MER) and the minimum variance (MV)
portfolios constitute two extreme solutions. The feasible MER portfolio for the United
States contains more Coal, Nuclear, and Wind than actual but markedly less Gas and
Oil ; the MV portfolio combines more Oil, Coal, Nuclear, and Wind but almost no Gas.
Regardless of the choice between MER and MV, U.S. utilities are found to lie substan-
tially inside the efficient frontier. This is even more true of their Swiss counterparts, likely
due to continuing regulation of electricity markets.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 5.2 contains a short description and cri-
tique of the conventional least-cost planning approach. Sectoral optimization is shown
to result in inefficiency in the presence of productivity shocks. However, the proposed
mean-variance portfolio approach requires a stable variance-covariance matrix of returns.
The construction of this matrix based on SURE is explained in Section 5.3. Section 5.4
is devoted to the empirical application to U.S. and Swiss data. First, the data base and
the SURE and OLS specifications are described. Econometric results ar presented and
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then used in the determination of efficient mean-variance frontiers with and without
constraints imposed. Section 5.5 contains a summary and suggestion for future research.
5.2 From Least-Cost Planning to Optimal Provision
of Electricity
This section expands the relationship between least-cost planning of electricity supply
and overall optimal provision of electricity. Traditionally, research has focused on identi-
fying power plants using a particular technology (e.g. gas as fuel) that achieve maximum
productivity (see e.g. Diewart and Nakamura (1999) and Kumar and Gupta, 2004). With
the advent of deregulation of power generation in the United States and the European
Union, this type of research has been concentrating on the distribution sector (see e.g.
Resende, 2002 and Farsi et al., 2008). However, the idea continues to be to allocate out-
put to the most productive (or least-cost, respectively) units. This sectoral approach rests
on the following concepts. Let there be a production process Y = f(X), mapping input
quantities X = (x1, ..., xm), X ∈ Rm+ into s output quantities Y = (y1, ..., ys), Y ∈ Rs+.
The production set is defined by (Koopmans, 1951 and Debreu, 1951)
Γj = {(Xj, Yj)| Yj ≤ f(Xj)}, (5.1)
describing all possible combinations (Xj, Yj). For illustration purposes, Figure 5.1A shows
the production set Γj for a single input (generating costs) and single output (kilowatt-
hours produced) for gas-fueled power plants. The combinations of interest are those on
the boundary of Γj which are technically efficient, meaning that for a given quantity of
input X¯j no more output Yj can be produced or inversely, no less input Xj can produce
a given output Y¯j. According to Shephard (1970) the boundary can be expressed as an
input or an output isoquant
Iso X(y) = {x| x ∈ X(y), θx 6∈ X(y), ∀ 0 < θ < 1}
Iso Y (x) = {y| y ∈ Y (x), θ−1y 6∈ Y (x),∀ 0 < θ < 1}, (5.2)
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with θ denoting a scalar by which all inputs can be reduced without leaving the feasibility
set or becoming technically efficient, respectively. Accordingly, θ−1 symbolizes the scaling-
up factor for the outputs.
Furthermore, overall productivity of domestic supply can be increased by investing in
those technologies Ψleast−cost that are most productive, satisfying
Ψleast−cost = arg max{Γ|Γj ∈ Γ}. (5.3)
However, as already argued in the introduction, in power generation technology is not
stable over time. In Figure 5.1A, the production set Γj (j = Gas) moves down between
periods t and t+1 due to a negative productivity shock. In this case, a least-cost strategy
may be inappropriate for domestic supply. Let Gt be one of the efficient gas-based power
companies. If it is to maintain its contribution to electricity supply (Y¯j), it would have to
use much more Gas (as indicated by point G′t+1), imparting a cost shock to total supply.
To the extent that other technologies (e.g. Hydro) are not affected by the shock, a
reallocation in favor of these technologies is indicated. In the extreme, this would amount
to holding the company to its initial input (and cost) level, causing it to move to point
G′′t+1. The associated shortfall in power supply would have to be made up by companies
using other technologies, causing them to deviate from their least-cost allocations.
A possible way to overcome the problem of inefficiency due to stochastic shocks is to
account for technology risk, e.g. indicated by the variance of efficient frontier determined
by the input or output isoquant. Deviations from least-cost planning now become possible
if the technology considered differs from the others in terms of risk.
However, this decision rule is still sectoral, failing to benefit from the possible risk di-
versification effects offered by a portfolio of generation technologies. Acting like a forward-
looking investor, the social planner limits his choice to the set of efficient portfolios. These
are portfolios that for a given level of risk σ¯2p offer the highest expected return or con-
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versely, for a given level of expected return R¯p offer the minimum risk. This is the solution
of two equivalent optimization problems (Markowitz, 1952),
max
wj
E(Rp) s.t. w
′1 = 1, w′Σw ≤ σ¯2p, (5.4)
min
wj
σ2p s.t. w
′1 = 1, w′E(R) ≥ R¯, (5.5)
with w as the vector of weights and the expected return E(Rp) given by
E(Rp) = [w1 · · ·wJ ]

E(R1)
...
E(RJ)
 = w′E(R), with
J∑
j=1
wj = 1. (5.6)
The volatility of the portfolio’s expected return involves not only the respective vari-
ances but all the covariances as well. Therefore, one has for the variance σ2p,
σ2p = [w1 · · ·wJ ]

σ11 · · · σ1J
...
. . .
...
σJ1 · · · σJJ


w1
...
wJ
 = w′Σw, with w′Σw > 0. (5.7)
In both formulations (5.4) and (5.5), the decision variables are the weights wj assigned
to the components of the portfolio, i.e. the generating technologies in the present context.
Figure 5.1B illustrates the case of three generating technologies Wind, Gas, and Nu-
clear. By assumption, Wind and Gas have a low risk with low expected return, while
Nuclear has a high risk that is negatively correlated to Wind and Gas. The horizontal
axis depicts risk, the vertical axis displays the expected return, respectively. For the mo-
ment, this is taken to be expected productivity E(Y/X); see Section 5.4.1 for more detail.
Three possible values of Yj/Xj can be read off Figure 5.1A as the slopes of rays from the
origin through points Gt, G
′
t+1, and G
′′
t+1, respectively. Note that they are defined by the
least-cost productive units for a given technology.
Starting with Gas and Nuclear, the social planner can allocate domestic supply be-
tween these two risky technologies. Without incorporating risk at all, least-cost planning
would call for a complete reliance on Nuclear because it offers the maximum expected
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Figure 5.1: Sectoral Least-cost and Portfolio Efficient Frontiers (Electricity)
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return (MER). A sectoral approach incorporating variances but neglecting the fact that
shocks can be less than perfectly correlated would result in a linear combination of Gas
and Nuclear, with weights wj inversely proportional to the respective variances (Zweifel
and Eisen, 2011, ch. 4.1.2). The solution of the optimization problem (4) or (5), respec-
tively results in the semi-elliptic efficient frontier linking Gas and Nuclear. The mix
of the two technologies varies along this frontier. The lower the coefficient of correlation
between shocks affecting Gas and Nuclear, the more marked is the concavity of the fron-
tier, indicating benefits of risk diversification. However, choice of the optimal portfolio
depends on the degree of risk aversion of the investor, reflected by the slope of his or her
indifference curves (marked EU for constant expected utility). As long as there are only
Gas and Nuclear and given moderate risk aversion, the optimum is given by point C∗,
the point of tangency of the efficient frontier and the indifference curve.
Now let there be a third technology (Wind). This creates additional opportunities for
diversification, shifting the efficient frontier upward and inward. As before, knowledge
of the investor’s risk preference would be necessary to predict the choice of optimal
provision (C∗∗). But because this knowledge is not available (at least concerning the
provision with electricity) for the United States and Switzerland, two extreme solutions
are worth pointing out. As can be gleaned from Figure 5.1B, a very risk-averse investor
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is predicted to opt for the minimum variance (MV) provision. By way of contrast, an
(almost) risk-neutral investor prefers the maximum expected return (MER) alternative,
usually implying a very different mix of generating technologies. Comparing these two
extreme solutions permits to assess the maximum influence of risk aversion on the optimal
provision of electricity.
Note that the portfolio approach does not revolve around single technologies, but an
efficient mix of several technologies. Even if a particular technology is dominated by others
in terms of risk and expected return, it may still contribute to the optimal provision of
electricity because of its diversification effect.
5.3 Construction of a Stable Variance-Covariance
Matrix (Σ)
One important condition for calculating the optimal allocation of generating technologies
is the estimation of a stable variance-covariance matrix Σ. An unstable estimate of Σ
would result in highly variable optimal weights w∗j of technologies [see eq. (5.6)]. Lack of
stability can be due to extreme shocks, which may cause outliers during several years.
One possibility that is widely suggested in financial literature (see e.g. Bodie et al.,
2005, ch. 13) to achieve time-invariant estimates is the generalized autoregressive condi-
tional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) or the autoregressive (AR) model of eq. (5.8),
Rj,t = βj,0 +
N∑
n=1
βj,n ∗Rj,t−n + εj,t, (5.8)
where Rj,t is the return of technology j in year t, βj,0 is a constant for technology j, βj,n
is the coefficient pertaining to the returns lagged n years, Ri,t−n is the dependent variable
lagged n years, and εj,t is the error term pertaining to technology j in year t.
However, while this formulation suffices to insulate expected conditional values Rj,t
from extreme shocks (which would spill over into the estimated correlation matrix), Krey
and Zweifel (2009) find that due to unobserved common shocks impinging on technolo-
gies at the same time, SURE (Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation) is the more
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efficient alternative. The correlation between the error terms εj,t constitutes information
that can be used in SURE to obtain sharper estimates of the β parameters (see Section
5.4.2 for empirical evidence).
In the example above, the SURE model consists of three regression equations (for
Wind, Gas, and Nuclear), each of which satisfies the assumptions of the standard regres-
sion model,
R1,t = a0 +
N∑
n=1
a1,nR1,t−n + ε1,t
R2,t = b0 +
N∑
n=1
b1,nR2,t−n + ε2,t
R3,t = c0 +
N∑
n=1
c1,nR3,t−n + ε3,t, (5.9)
where R1,t, R2,t, R3,t are the returns of technologies j = 1, 2, 3 in year t. a0, b0, and c0
are their respective constants, a1,n, b2,n, c3,n are the coefficients of returns lagged n years,
R1,t−n, R2,t−n, R3,t−n are the dependent variable lagged n years, and ε1,t, ε2,t, ε3,t are the
error terms with E(εj,t) = 0, and E(εi,tεj,s) = σi,j if t = s and = 0 if t 6= s. This is
the SURE specification, admitting nonzero contemporaneous correlations between error
terms. Thus, the variance-covariance matrix Σ of residuals is not diagonal,
Σ = E(εε′) =

σ1,1 σ1,2 σ1,3
σ2,1 σ2,2 σ2,3
σ3,1 σ3,2 σ3,3
 . (5.10)
By way of contrast, OLS estimation would be superior if the variance-covariance matrix
were diagonal. However, this does not hold for U.S. and Swiss power technologies (see
Section 5.4.2).
In sum, SURE allows to simultaneously estimate the expected returns and the vari-
ances for all power generation technologies in one regression, taking into account possible
correlations of error terms across equations.
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5.4 Empirical Application to U.S. and Swiss Elec-
tricity Data
In this section, theory and data are combined for the construction of efficient frontiers for
electricity-generating technologies in the United States and Switzerland. This calls for an
estimate of expected returns E(Rj) for each technology j that potentially is part of the
optimal provision, of its variance σ2j , and its covariances σij. Estimates of these quantities
come from the SURE results shown in Section 5.4.2. Results presented in Sections 5.4.3
and 5.4.4 contrast the actual portfolio (AP) of both countries with the minimum vari-
ance (MV) and maximum expected return (MER) alternatives, which correspond to the
optimum allocation in case of extremely marked and very weak degrees of risk aversion,
respectively (see Section 5.2).
5.4.1 Data and Model Specifications
This article uses time-series data on annual power generation returns for several tech-
nologies. Contrary to the theoretical exposition in the preceding sections, which is in
terms of productivity levels for simplicity, returns are measured as annual changes in
productivity, with productivity equated to kWh electricity produced per U.S. cent.2 This
definition is similar to that of Berger et al. (2003) and Awerbuch and Berger (2003), who
point out that a rational investor more likely relies on productivity changes than levels
when choosing the technology mix for the future. In full analogy, a financial investor buys
a stock in view of its expected future change in value rather than its current price.
The U.S. data set consists of five variables; Coal, Nuclear, Gas, Oil, and Wind power3,
covering the years 1982 to 2003. Unfortunately, no data were available for Hydro, which
contributed an estimated 6 to 10 percent to total U.S. power supply. Nevertheless, more
than 90 percent of U.S. generating capacity is covered, going beyond earlier work that was
2 The mean value of the exchange rate for the year 2000 was used to convert Swiss cents into U.S.
cents, as published by the U.S. Federal Reserve (http://research.stlouisfed.org).
3 Data for Coal, Nuclear, Gas and Oil were obtained from the UIC (2005). Wind (State Hawaii, USA
(www.state.hi.us) and U.S. Department of Energy (www.energy.gov)). Since the Wind data was not
available for every year, values for 1983, 1985-1987, 1989-1994, 1996-1999 were generated by cubic
spline interpolation (Knott, 2000).
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limited to three technologies (Awerbuch, 2006 and Humphreys and McClain, 1998). The
Swiss data on Nuclear 4 cover the years 1986 to 2003, those on Run of river 5 and Storage
hydro6 1993 to 2003, and Solar 7, 1991 to 2003. Throughout, generation costs comprise
(i) fuel costs, (ii) costs of current operations, and (iii) capital user cost8 (depreciation of
book value plus interest). In the case of Nuclear, decommissioning and waste disposal are
also included.
For both countries, an externality surcharge for environmental damage caused by power
generation is added to the costs of each technology. As in previous studies (Awerbuch,
2006 and Awerbuch, 2005), these cost data are available for total production only, preclud-
ing a differentiation according to load segments. Finally, from an efficiency point of view,
the price of a product should reflect external costs only to the extent that the marginal
benefit of internalization effort still covers its marginal cost. However, the externality
surcharge corresponds to total estimated external cost per kWh electricity, reflecting the
implicit assumption that full internalization is optimal. The data on external costs were
obtained from the European Commission (2003) for the United States and Hirschberg
and Jakob (1999) for Switzerland.9 While external costs related to health and global
warming do enter calculations, no data are available for some other categories such as
external costs related to agriculture and forestry. In this paper, the upper bound of social
cost estimates is adopted for both countries.
The resulting productivity levels are displayed in Table 5.1 together with the shares
of technologies in the U.S. and Swiss power generation portfolios. As noted in panel A,
the U.S. mix predominantly consists of fossil fuels (56 percent Coal, 18 percent Gas, and
3 percent Oil), with Nuclear accounting for another 21 percent of production. However,
with externality surcharges included, these weights do not reflect productivity levels.
While the productivity of Coal with its share of 56 percent is some 11 kWh per U.S. $
4 Data sources: KKl (2005), KKG (2005)
5 Data source: personal correspondence
6 Data source: personal correspondence
7 RWE (2005); The average exchange rate of 2000 was used to convert Euro cents into U.S. cents
(source: U.S. Federal Reserve). RWE data from Germany is used as a proxy for Swiss solar electricity
data, since solar generation technologies in both countries are similar.
8 Capital user cost can be defined in several ways. The variant “linear depreciation and interest” is
used here exclusively due to lack of source data that would permit to calculate other variants.
9 No external cost data for the United States were available; therefore data from the United Kingdom
were used (European Commission, 2003).
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(busbar) in 2003, Wind power is far more productive but accounts for 2 percent only.
By way of contrast, the Swiss portfolio in panel B seems to match productivity levels
much better. It relies heavily on highly productive Hydro (32 percent Storage hydro, 24
percent Run of river); Nuclear accounts for 40 percent, Solar (a proxy of all renewable
and conventional thermic technologies with a low productivity of 2 kWh per U.S. $), for
a mere 4 percent.
Table 5.1: Current Portfolio Weights (Percent) and Productivity Levels (kWh/U.S. $,
Prices of 2000)
Panel A: United States∗ Panel B: Switzerland
Technology Weights Productivity Technology Weights Productivity
1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003 1995 2003
Nuclear 21 21 17 26 Nuclear 39 40 20 29
Coal 57 56 9 11 Storage hydro 27 32 39 52
Gas 17 18 16 13 Run of river 32 24 18 25
Oil 3 3 9 10 Solar 2 4 1 2
Wind 2 2 18 23
∗ Excluding hydro
Source: Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE) (2003), IAE (2005)
However, recall that productivity changes rather than levels are relevant for investors,
who would have wanted to buy into Swiss Solar in 1995 in view of its rapid productivity
increase in the course of nine years. From an investor point of view, Swiss Solar should
therefore figure prominently in an efficient portfolio unless it has extremely unfavorable
diversification properties.
Finally, the SURE models need to be specified. Eqs. (5.11) display the U.S. specifica-
tions that have the best statistical properties (see Section 5.4.2 below), selecting 2003 as
the year of reference for the efficient portfolios,
RNucl,03 = n0 + n1RNucl,02 + n2Trendt + εNucl,03
RCoal,03 = c0 + c1RCoal,02 + c2Trendt + εCoal,03
RGas,03 = g0 + g1RGas,02 + g2RGas,01 + g3RGas,00 + g4Trendt + εGas,03
ROil,03 = b0 + b1RGas,02 + b2RGas,01 + b3RGas,00 + b4RGas,99 + b5Trendt + εOil,03
RWind,03 = d0 + d1RWind,02 + d2Trendt + εWind,03. (5.11)
Generally, influences such as technological change are hypothesized to influence pro-
ductivity of electricity generation and hence returns. However, estimating such a compre-
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hensive model is beyond the scope of this study. Rather, the relative productivity change
of Nuclear in the United States in the year 2003 e.g., RNucl,03, is related to a constant
(n0), the productivity changes in the preceding year RNucl,02, and a time trend (Trendt).
In analogy, the productivity change of Nuclear in Switzerland in the year 2003,RNucl,03,
is related to a constant (n′0), the productivity changes in the preceding years RNucl,02,
RNucl,01, RNucl,00, and RNucl,99, and a time trend (Trendt). The remaining eqs. (5.12) refer
to Run of river (Ror), Storage hydro (Sh), and Solar (Solar also includes other renewable
energy sources such as waste),
RNucl,03 = n
′
0 + n
′
1RNucl,02 + n
′
2RNucl,01 + n
′
3RNucl,00 + n
′
4RNucl,99 + n
′
5Trendt + ε
′
Nucl,03
RRor,03 = r
′
0 + r
′
1RRor,02 + r
′
2Trendt + ε
′
Ror,03
RSh,03 = h
′
0 + h
′
1RSh,02 + h
′
2Trendt + ε
′
Sh,03
RSolar,03 = s
′
0 + s
′
1RSolar,02 + s
′
2RSolar,01 + s
′
3RSolar,00 + s
′
4RSolar,99 + s
′
5Trendt + ε
′
Solar,03. (5.12)
5.4.2 Preliminary Testing and Econometric Results
The objective is to obtain a stable estimate of the covariance matrix Σ derived from eqs.
(5.11) and (5.12). In order to be able to filter out the systematic (trend stable) component
of Σ, changes in productivity must form stationary time series. Given non-stationarity,
the estimate of Σ would shift over time, precluding the estimation of a reasonably stable
efficient frontier [Wooldridge (2003), ch. 11]. To test for stationarity, the augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was applied. Results indicate at the one percent significance
level that all productivity changes in the U.S. and Swiss data sets are stationary. To
determine the correct lag order for the SURE regressions, several tests were applied, viz.
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Hannan & Quinn’s information criterion (HQIC),
Schwartz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), and the likelihood ratio test (LR) (Al-
Subaihi, 2002 and Liew, 2004). The results for the U.S. data suggest five lags for Oil,
three lags for Gas, and one lag for Coal. One lag was used for Wind and Nuclear, based on
considerations of goodness of fit in SURE. The results for the Swiss data suggest four lags
for Nuclear, while in the case of Storage hydro and Run of river, one lag suffices. Tests
are inconclusive for Solar. However, Liew (2004) shows that lag selection tests may lack
validity if the sample is small. Using a sample size of 25 he finds that the probability of
correctly estimating the true order of an autoregressive process ranges between 58 percent
106 Essays on the Efficient Use of Public Resources
(SBIC) and 60 percent (HQIC). In view of the inconclusive evidence and the fact that the
coefficients on the autoregressive variables used in the SURE procedure are significant
without exception, four lags were applied throughout in the case of Switzerland for Solar.
Table 5.2: Econometric Results, United States (1982-2003)
Panel A: Results of SURE regression, dependent variable Rt: relative productivity change
R¯ St.D. Const. Rt−1 Rt−2 Rt−3 Rt−4 Rt−5 Trend Obs R2
Coal 5.2 2.0 −0.09∗∗ 0.02 0.003∗∗ 17 0.67
Nuclear 5.8 1.8 −0.05∗ 0.38∗ 0.001 17 0.07
Gas 3.9 11.7 −0.32∗∗ 0.10 -0.89** 0.12 0.018∗∗ 17 0.67
Oil 2.5 10.4 −1.05∗∗ −0.96∗∗ -1.35** −1.17∗∗ -1.21** -
0.62*
0.050∗∗ 17 0.67
Wind 5.4 6.9 −0.03 0.73∗∗ 0.001 17 0.51
Panel B: Results of OLS regression, dependent variable Rt: relative productivity change
R¯ St.D. Const. Rt−1 Rt−2 Rt−3 Rt−4 Rt−5 Trend Obs R2
Coal 4.8 1.5 −0.06∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.002∗ 21 0.36
Nuclear 4.8 2.3 −0.01 0.30 −0.002 21 0.21
Gas 3.6 10.5 −0.26∗ 0.13 -0.78** 0.23 0.015∗ 19 0.69
Oil 2.5 9.7 −0.91∗ −0.85∗ -1.21** −0.94 -1.10* -
0.43
0.043∗ 17 0.62
Wind 4.1 2.6 −0.05∗ 0.21∗ 0.002 21 0.72
** significant at 1 percent level, * significant at 5 percent level.
The resulting SURE and OLS regressions are displayed in Table 5.2 for the United
States and Table 5.3 for Switzerland together with their estimated average returns R¯
and standard deviations St.D. Comparing the results of SURE and OLS estimates, the
first thing to note is that due to its fuller use of information, SURE results in sharper
coefficient estimates than OLS. In the regressions for the United States, 15 SURE but
only 13 OLS coefficients out of a theoretical total of 35 are significant at the 5 percent
level or better. In the regression for Switzerland, 14 SURE but only 1 OLS coefficient
out of a theoretical total of 24 are significant. This difference is of importance because
the objective is to filter out transitory shocks in productivity development for obtaining
a stable estimate of the variance-covariance matrix Σ. Clearly, SURE estimates serve
this purpose better than their OLS counterparts. Also, the contrasts between estimates
are sometimes striking. Notably, the SURE results of Table 5.2 (col. “Const.”, panel
A) suggest a productivity-decreasing drift of 5 percent p.a. in American Nuclear, while
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according to the OLS estimate (panel B), the hypothesis of no drift cannot be rejected.
In the case of Wind, it is the other way round. In the Swiss regressions, Solar exhibits
the expected upward productivity shift in the SURE estimation (panel A of Table 5.3),
which would have not been recognized as significant in the OLS alternative (panel B).
Table 5.3: Econometric Results, Switzerland (1986-2003)
Panel A: Results of SURE regression, dependent variable Rt: relative productivity change
R¯ St.D. Const. Rt−1 Rt−2 Rt−3 Rt−4 Trend Obs R2
Nuclear −3.6 12.9 −0.04 0.74∗∗ 0.93** 1.22∗∗ 1.37** 0.18∗∗ 9 0.74
Run of river −4.1 18.6 −0.33 0.70∗∗ 0.20 9 0.51
Storage
hydro
−1.2 12.0 −0.25 0.72∗∗ 0.02 9 0.22
Solar 6.7 1.0 0.34∗∗ 0.73∗∗ 0.56* 0.61∗ 0.55* −0.01∗∗ 9 0.63
Panel B: Results of OLS regression, dependent variable Rt: relative productivity change
R¯ St.D. Const. Rt−1 Rt−2 Rt−3 Rt−4 Trend Obs R2
Nuclear 4.3 2.2 0.10 0.03 0.29 0.14 0.38 −0.001 14 0.38
Run of river −1.6 1.6 −0.11 0.64∗ 0.01 10 0.44
Storage
hydro
−0.8 9.1 −0.20 0.54 0.01 10 0.35
Solar 6.7 1.0 0.32 0.69 0.60 0.58 0.40 −0.01 9 0.64
** significant at 1 percent level, * significant at 5 percent level.
The presence of correlations across equations is of interest because they determine the
diversification effects in the portfolio. Panel A of Table 5.4 does indicate some negative
correlations in the SURE residuals for the United States, with that between Wind and
Coal attaining a value of −0.4246. Panel B of Table 5.4 permits a comparison with OLS
residuals. While the estimated correlation coefficient for Wind and Coal would have been
similar with −0.4062, correlation coefficients between Nuclear and Coal are less marked
than their SURE counterparts. A striking difference can be seen in the case of Gas and
Wind. The correlation between the SURE residuals is positive, while that between OLS
residuals is negative.
In the case of Switzerland (Table 5.5), the highest partial correlation coefficient be-
tween SURE residuals (panel A) is obtained for Solar and Nuclear (0.5933), followed
by Run of river and Storage hydro (0.5054). In the latter case, the common unobserved
shock clearly is weather conditions, in particular the amount of precipitation. The perti-
nent correlation coefficients between OLS residuals (panel B) are somewhat larger with
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Table 5.4: Correlation Matrices for the United States
Panel A: Partial correlation coefficients for ε̂i,t residuals from eqs. (5.11), using SURE (1982-2003)
Coal Nuclear Gas Oil Wind
Coal 1
Nuclear −0.1140 1
Gas 0.7605 0.0113 1
Oil −0.3317 0.4461 −0.2621 1
Wind −0.4246 −0.2520 0.1150 −0.1492 1
Panel B: Partial correlation coefficients for ε̂i,t residuals from eqs. (5.11), using OLS (1982-2003)
Coal Nuclear Gas Oil Wind
Coal 1
Nuclear −0.0329 1
Gas 0.7050 −0.0004 1
Oil −0.2835 0.3670 −0.1362 1
Wind −0.4062 −0.1644 −0.2073 0.0998 1
0.7201 for Solar and Nuclear and about the same for Run of river and Storage hydro
with 0.5066.
Table 5.5: Correlation Matrices for Switzerland
Panel A: Partial correlation coefficients for ε̂i,t residuals from eqs. (5.12), using SURE (1986-2003)
Nuclear Storage hydro Run of river Solar
Nuclear 1
Storage hydro −0.4644 1
Run of river −0.2685 0.5054 1
Solar 0.5933 0.0367 −0.5907 1
Panel B: Partial correlation coefficients for ε̂i,t residuals from eqs. (5.12), using OLS (1986-2003)
Nuclear Storage hydro Run of river Solar
Nuclear 1
Storage hydro 0.3111 1
Run of river −0.0550 0.5066 1
Solar 0.7201 0.2056 −0.3824 1
In sum, in contradistinction to previous studies which solely relied on OLS estimates,
SURE is found to benefit from substantial correlations between unobserved shocks im-
pinging on generating technologies. Therefore, the pertinent estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix of returns Σ can be expected to be more stable than its OLS-based
counterpart.
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5.4.3 Efficient Provision of U.S. Electricity
Figure 5.2A displays the efficient frontier for the provision of electricity in the United
States, along with the actual portfolio (AP) of 2003. No constraints are imposed on
the optimization problem [see eqs. (5.4) and (5.5)] at this time. If the country’s sole
interest were to maximize expected return (thus maximizing the expected decrease of
power generation costs), it would choose the MER (maximum expected return) portfolio,
which contains Nuclear exclusively. If it wished to minimize risk, opting for the MV
(minimum variance) portfolio, then a mix of 56 percent Nuclear and 44 percent Coal
would be optimal. Therefore, the degree of risk aversion characterizing the United States
Figure 5.2: Efficient Electricity Portfolios for the United States (2003, SURE-based)
ER Risk Coal Nuclear Gas Oil Wind
AP2003 5.00 3.10 56 21 18 3 2
MER 5.76 1.80 100
MV 5.50 1.46 44 56
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ER Risk Coal Nuclear Gas Oil Wind
AP2003 5.00 3.10 56 21 18 3 2
MER_C 5.20 2.32 60 25 10 5
MV_C 5.07 2.03 60 25  1  9  5
A) SURE-based, no constraints B) SURE-based, with constraints
clearly matters. However, risk aversion has its price because opting for MV rather than
MER would entail a productivity increase of 5.50 rather than 5.76 percent p.a. Still,
the MV portfolio with its annual volatility of 1.46 percent beats the actual one whose
productivity advance is 5.00 percent only, associated with an annual volatility of 3.10
percent. Yet a share of Nuclear amounting to 100 rather than 21 percent in the MER
portfolio (56 rather than 21 percent in the MV portfolio, respectively) must be deemed
unrealistic for the United States of 2003. Therefore, Figure 5.2B shows an efficient frontier
that takes into account that the current portfolio could be adjusted at considerable cost
110 Essays on the Efficient Use of Public Resources
only. Since adjustment costs are unknown, upper limits for Coal ≤ 60%, Nuclear ≤ 25%,
Oil ≤ 10%, and Wind ≤ 5% are imposed on the individual shares for simplicity to reflect
technical feasibility.
In the MER C (with “C” for constrained) portfolio, the generation mix now contains
60 percent Coal, 25 percent Nuclear, 10 percent Gas, and 5 percent Wind, indicating
that constraints are binding. Compared to the actual portfolio, productivity develop-
ment would still speed up (from 5.00 percent p.a. to 5.20 percent p.a.), while volatility
would be reduced from 3.10 to 2.32 percent p.a. In the MV C alternative, the highest
share is again allocated to Coal (60 percent, binding10, up from 56 percent in the actual
portfolio), followed by Nuclear (25 percent, binding, up from 21 percent), Oil (9 percent,
up from 3 percent), and Wind (5 percent, again binding, up from 2 percent). The only
technology to lose market share is Gas (a mere 1 percent, down from 18 percent). The
rate of productivity increase would still attain 5.07 percent p.a. rather than 5.00 as in
the actual portfolio, while risk declines to 2.03 from 3.10. One explanation of why Gas is
almost phased out is its weak diversification effect, the correlation coefficient of its SURE
residuals with Coal attaining 0.7605, the maximum value of panel A of Table 5.4. In the
whole, current U.S. power generation is inefficient. It could be made more efficient by
substituting Gas by Coal, Nuclear, Oil (not in the MER C portfolio), and Wind.
If correlated shocks affecting generation costs would not have been taken into account
(as in past studies), the results would have been very different, quite possibly misguiding
the choice of an optimal technology mix. Figure 5.3 displays the OLS-based efficient
frontiers and allocations. Without constraints (Figure 5.3A), the MER portfolio would
have contained 100 percent Coal11 (rather than 100 percent Nuclear as in the SURE-based
case, see Figure 5.2A). The MV alternative, on the other hand, would have called for a
portfolio with 63 percent Coal, 27 percent Nuclear, and 10 percent Wind, quite different
from the SURE-based solution that excludes Wind while allocating 56 percent (rather
than 27 percent) to Nuclear. Moreover, the United States would have little incentive to
adjust its technology mix because OLS-based expected returns are only slightly higher and
10 Using portfolio theory for three U.S. generating technologies, Berger et al. (2003) also concluded
that Coal dominates the MV portfolio with a share of 77 percent.
11 Berger et al. (2003), who do not control for correlation between unobserved shocks, also arrive at
100 percent Coal.
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Figure 5.3: Efficient Electricity Portfolios for the United States (2003, OLS-based)
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volatilities slightly lower than estimated actual ones. With constraints imposed, however,
OLS-based estimates would have resulted in efficient portfolios that practically coincide
with the SURE-based ones (compare weights below Figures 5.2B and 5.3B). This was to
be expected since most constraints are binding in both alternatives.
5.4.4 Efficient Provision of Swiss Electricity
Figure 5.4 displays the efficient electricity portfolios (as of 2003) for Switzerland. In
Figure 5.4A (no constraints imposed), it is Solar rather than Nuclear (contrary to the
United States) that dominates the MER portfolio with a 100 percent share. Opting for
the MER portfolio, the country would achieve a productivity increase of 6.67 percent
p.a. (rather than the 2 percent decrease with the actual portfolio), with volatility down
from 10 to 1.05 percent p.a.. The MV portfolio consists of 98 percent Solar and 2 percent
Nuclear, expected return being 6.43 percent p.a. and risk, a mere 1 percent. Clearly, in
both countries non-CO2 emitting technologies (Nuclear in the United States and Solar
in Switzerland) play a dominant role in the unconstrained efficient portfolios. However,
shares of Solar close to 100 percent must be deemed unrealistic for Switzerland. Therefore,
Storage hydro, Run of river, and Solar are constrained to their actual shares in 2003 (32,
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24 and 4 percent p.a., respectively), leaving only Nuclear unconstrained. This can be
justified by noting that Storage hydro and Run of river are already being utilized to full
capacity (Laufer et al., 2004), while a share of Solar electricity of 4 percent constitutes
the limit of what could have been achieved. The corresponding efficient frontier is shown
in Figure 5.4B.
Figure 5.4: Efficient Electricity Portfolios for Switzerland (2003, SURE-based)
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The MER C portfolio calls for a complete substitution of Run of river (actual share
24 percent) by Nuclear (64 percent), Storage hydro (32 percent, binding), and Solar (4
percent, binding). This surprising result is due to the fact that Run of river is highly
correlated with Storage hydro, indicating that it has no diversification potential (see the
correlation coefficient of 0.5054 in Table 5.5A). At the same time, this technology has been
subject to productivity decrease (see panel A of Table 5.3). In all, Figure 5.4B suggests
that if “realistic” constraints are respected, Swiss power generation could be made more
efficient by allowing the share of Nuclear to substantially increase and abandoning Run
of river. Expected return would slightly increase, from -2.00 (actual) to -1.82 percent,
regardless of choice between MER and MV portfolios, and volatility would drop from 10
(actual) to 8.89.
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Results based on OLS-estimated efficient frontier are displayed in Figure 5.5. Acting
on OLS-based estimates, Switzerland would have expected marked productivity increases
rather than the decreases implied by SURE, at the same time severely underestimating
volatility. Finally, the country would have wrongly slashed the share of Storage hydro
from 32 percent to 0 percent (MER C) or 8 percent (MV C), respectively. Therefore, the
choice of statistical specification may again well matter for decision-making.
Figure 5.5: Efficient Electricity Portfolios for Switzerland (2003, OLS-based)
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5.4.5 United States and Switzerland Compared
This section is devoted to a comparison of results obtained for the two countries as of the
year 2003, using SURE-based estimates. Starting with no constraints imposed (Figures
5.2A and 5.4A), the United States could have achieved an average productivity increase
of 5.76 p.a. by adopting the MER portfolio, Switzerland even 6.67 percent p.a. However,
both countries would have had to completely change the composition of their technology
portfolio, to 100 percent Nuclear (United States) and 100 percent Solar (Switzerland),
respectively. Turning to the MV alternative, the volatility reduction achieved amounts to
1.54 percentage points (3.10 - 1.46) for the United States, much less than for Switzerland
with its 9.00 percentage points (10.00 - 1.00). The implications in terms of portfolio
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composition are quite different for the two countries as well. Whereas opting for the MV
alternative calls for 56 percent (rather than 100 percent) Nuclear in the case of the United
States, it would leave Solar at almost 100 percent in the case of Switzerland. Since shares
close to 100 percent are far from reality in either country, constraints on admissible shares
of technologies were imposed in Figures 5.2B and 5.4B. This causes the existing amount
of diversification to diminish in both countries, with Coal (United States) and Nuclear
(Switzerland) becoming the principal energy sources. However, only the Swiss expected
rate of return drops (from a 6.43 percent productivity increase to a 1.82 percent decrease
for the MV C portfolio), associated with a marked surge in volatility.
On the whole, it appears that the U.S. electricity industry, while respecting feasibility
constraints, would have gained by substituting Gas by Coal, Nuclear, and Wind tech-
nologies by 2003, regardless of the choice between the MER C and the MV C portfolio.
Swiss utilities would have stood to gain as well by adopting more Nuclear to the detri-
ment of Run of river, an important source of primary energy until recently. Divergences
of U.S. and Swiss actual choices and efficient choices likely arose in the past since gener-
ating technologies have been selected solely on an individual, case-per-case basis, failing
to consider their contribution to overall portfolio performance. Both industries at present
fall short of their respective efficiency frontiers. In the United States, the gap amounts
to a foregone 0.07 to 0.20 percentage points productivity increase p.a. and 0.78 to 1.07
points reduction of volatility (see Figure 5.2B). In Switzerland, the estimates amount
to a foregone 0.18 percentage points of productivity growth and 1.11 points reduction
of risk (see Figure 5.4B). Therefore, there is some evidence suggesting that the more
heavily regulated Swiss industry is characterized by a higher degree of inefficiency in the
allocation of generating technologies than its largely deregulated U.S. counterpart.
5.5 Conclusion
The objective of this contribution is to determine the efficient provision of electricity
in the United States (traditionally fossil-based) and Switzerland (traditionally hydro-
and nuclear-based), applying portfolio theory. The observation period covers 1982 to
2003 (United States) and 1986 to 2003 (Switzerland), respectively. Because the error
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terms proved to be correlated across equations explaining technology-specific productiv-
ity changes, Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE) was adopted for esti-
mating the covariance matrix used in determining the efficient frontier. Interestingly, the
maximum expected return (MER) portfolios of both countries boil down to one non-CO2
energy source (Nuclear in the United States and Solar in Switzerland). When constraints
limiting changes from the status quo are imposed to reflect the high cost associated with
adjusting the technology mix, the MER C portfolio for the United States contains 60
percent Coal (up from 56 percent) and for Switzerland, 64 percent Nuclear (up from 40
percent).
However, one could argue that for populations as risk-averse as the American and the
Swiss (Szpiro, 1986), the minimum variance portfolio (MV) is appropriate. Adopting the
MV criterion and imposing the same constraints, U.S. utilities would still want to assign
60 percent of their portfolio to Coal, almost entirely replacing Gas. The productivity
changes and hence returns of Gas are not only highly volatile but also strongly correlated
with those of other technologies, depriving it of a possible diversification effect. At the
same time, Coal -generated electricity became cleaner, causing (initially high) external
costs to fall and making Coal very attractive from an investor point of view. In the Swiss
MV C portfolio (subject to constraints), Nuclear accounts for even 64 percent while Run
of river drops out (down from 24 percent). One is therefore led to conclude that as of
2003, both the U.S. and Swiss technology mix are inefficient even if “realistic” constraints
are respected. While U.S. utilities are currently closer to their efficiency frontier than
their more heavily regulated Swiss counterparts, they still may reap efficiency gains by
investing more in Coal and moving away from Gas.
The choice of econometric methodology proves important for decision-making. Effi-
ciency frontiers estimated by OLS would tend to underestimate both expected returns
and risk reduction potential in the case of the United States but overestimate achievable
expected returns and underestimating risk reduction in the case of Switzerland. These
discrepancies largely vanish, however, when feasibility constraints are imposed. Still, fail-
ure to account for correlation between unobserved shocks impinging on the different
generation technologies using SURE does create the risk of opting for an inefficient solu-
tion. This finding contrasts with Berger et al. (2003), who concluded that the outcome
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of portfolio analysis is insensitive to econometric estimation techniques. However, the
present study agrees with earlier ones in suggesting that utilities and policy makers, by
adopting a single-technology approach typical of conventional least-cost planning, fail to
take account of correlations between risky generating technologies. The consequence is a
portfolio of generating technologies that is inefficient, achieving a too low expected rate
of return and/or suffering from excessive volatility.
These statements are based on an investor view. One could also adopt a current user
view, which emphasizes productivity levels rather than productivity changes over time.
Future contributions therefore may compare the two views. They could also focus on pre-
diction rather than postdiction, examining whether emergent new technologies are part
of future efficient frontiers. Finally, the strong assumption of a once-and-for-all decision
regarding the choice of technology needs to be relaxed. A real options approach could be
used to account for the irreversibility often inherent in the decision to adopt a technology.
Deferring adoption may become the preferred choice in the face of stochastic productivity
changes caused e.g. by a liberalization of electricity markets – or its failure to materialize
as expected. Still, the present study provides first indications of where to go in the future
in an attempt to reach the efficient mix of power-generating technologies in countries
that are as diverse as e.g. the United States and Switzerland.
CHAPTER VI
Conclusion

6Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the key findings and policy recommendations of each essay,
followed by possible suggestions for future research.
The objective in Chapter 2 was to determine the efficiency of all 26 member states
(cantons) in Switzerland and examine whether fiscal equalization influences their effi-
ciency. Aggregate output performance indicators, including six major public services,
were constructed to calculate cantonal efficiency scores based on robust data envelop-
ment analysis. The results suggest two main policy implications. First, a comparison of
the six service categories revealed that cantons with high overall performance do not
automatically outperform in all categories, preventing any one from becoming dominant
in Tiebout competition. Second, the equity-efficiency trade-off noted by Stiglitz (1988)
seems to exist in Switzerland. Both cantons that are payers and cantons that are receivers
seek to keep their ’financial potential’ low by producing public services at higher than
minimum cost, the former to ease their burden and the latter to receive more trans-
fer payments and subsidies. However, substituting earmarked federal subsidies, the main
component of transfer payments prior to 2008, for freely disposable lump-sum subsidies as
part of the new equalization program implemented in 2008 is likely to enhance cantonal
performance.
The results presented in Chapter 3 support the relevance of accounting for hetero-
geneity in the measurement of hospital performance. Standard frontier models, which
assume homogeneous technology for all hospitals, fail to detect all the cost variability
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among hospitals that is caused by heterogeneity due to exogenous influences. Efficiency
estimates of approximately 100 Swiss hospitals for the years 2004 to 2007 reveal that
those rated 85 percent efficient or less (using the standard frontier model) would gain
up to 12 percentage points when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account using a
random parameter frontier model. Therefore, quite a few highly efficient hospitals could
end up in financial distress if regulators cut reimbursement rates in an attempt to enforce
the cost reductions indicated by the standard frontier model.
Chapter 4 provides a confirmation of the theoretical expectation that a prospective
payment system increases hospital cost efficiency. Payment systems designed to put hos-
pitals at operating risk seem to be more effective at reducing hospital costs than retro-
spective payment systems. However, with respect to the Swiss hospital payment reform
effective in 2012, this requires that the implementation be fully prospective and must pre-
clude any bailouts. Results relating to the global budget system reveal that if hospitals
can obtain higher budgets to cover past errors, then the incentive for cost minimization
disappears. In addition, the settings for the remuneration per admission are also impor-
tant. Whereas general remuneration settings with a per diem element can be used to
unnecessarily keep a patient in the hospital, a DRG system strengthens incentives for
cost minimization. However, DRG is not fully effective after initiation and additional
efficiency gains occur later on, but these are smaller in the third year than in the second
year.
Finally, in Chapter 5 a portfolio theory for a risk adjusted efficiency measurement
was applied to determine the efficient provision of electricity in the United States and
Switzerland. The seemingly unrelated regression estimation (SURE) method was adopted
for estimating the covariance matrix used in determining the efficient frontier. The re-
sults support the notion that adopting a single-technology approach, which is typical
of conventional least-cost planning, fails to take into account correlations between risky
generating technologies. In particular, populations as risk-averse as Americans (Szpiro,
1986) are strongly advised to adopt a feasible minimum variance portfolio comprised of
60 percent coal, 25 percent nuclear, 9 percent oil, 5 percent wind, and 1 percent gas. In
the Swiss case, a feasible portfolio for a risk-averse population would include 64 percent
nuclear, 32 percent storage hydro, and 4 percent solar. Run-of-the-river (ROR) hydroelec-
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tricity drops from 24 percent in the status quo to zero in the minimum variance portfolio,
mostly due to diversification effects. In regards to their actual 2003 portfolios, both the
U.S. and Swiss technology mixes were inefficient even if “realistic” constraints are ap-
plied. While U.S. utilities are currently closer to their efficiency frontier than their more
strictly regulated Swiss counterparts, they may still reap efficiency gains by investing
more in coal and moving away from gas.
This thesis has spotlighted four areas where efficiency measurement techniques are
useful in uncovering market inefficiency, providing potential targets for cost reduction.
Switzerland could increase its competitiveness with policy reforms that increase the in-
centive for efficient transformation of production inputs into outputs. This is not neces-
sarily limited to the provision of public goods or to the hospital and electricity markets.
It could be an indication for all markets where conditions for Pareto efficiency are re-
stricted. Therefore, although all the results presented in Chapters 2 through 5 appear to
be very specific, they address an issue of general importance and provide starting points
for further research. Here, four possible extensions are summarized.
The first extension is methodological and aims to incorporate the production uncer-
tainty in Chapter 5 into the single-technology framework of Chapters 2 through 4. Al-
though many articles have already examined the development of production technologies
over time, no study has incorporated technology uncertainty in the estimates. Technology
change is always measured deterministically, meaning that the entire distance between
the technology frontiers is measured as technology improvement. A frequently applied
measurement instrument is the Malmquist index introduced by Caves et al. (1982). How-
ever, as shown in Chapter 5, exogenous shocks can influence productivity as well, making
productivity changes over time rather stochastic. Thus, the distance between the tech-
nology frontiers should be split into a productivity and a random noise term, congruent
to the stochastic frontier analysis for individual observations (see Chapters 3 and 4).
Therefore, the model of Chapter 5 could be extended with a composite error term that
incorporates a positively distributed productivity term and a normally distributed ran-
dom noise term for technology risk. The application of an extended model would not only
enable unbiased estimates of technology improvement, it would also reveal information
about the importance of market uncertainty.
122 Essays on the Efficient Use of Public Resources
The second extension is related to the recent merging of local communities in several
member states (e.g., Luzern, Glarus) with the goal of achieving cost efficiency gains.
Politicians expect the potential for economies of scale in the provision of public goods.
Although Chapter 2 reveals some evidence in favor of decentralization, no detailed results
are shown regarding economies of scale or the optimal size of local communities. This is
an issue for further research. However, the optimal size of a local community could differ
among public services. Thus, aggregation on a local community level may be not efficient
(Frey, 2005).
Chapter 3 and 4 are also valuable starting points for future research. Although cost
savings have been found for hospitals with a prospective payment system, the results are
not yet sufficient to make any conclusion about its influence on health care expenditure.
In particular, health care expenditure may increase if cost savings are only due to a cost
shift from inpatient to outpatient or rehabilitation care or if the number of admissions
increases. Further research could address these situations.
Finally, the case of Switzerland makes it clear that the assumption of an autarky
market in Chapter 5 is not realistic. In 2009, Switzerland exported 54.2 billion kWh of
the 66.5 billion kWh generated domestically and simultaneously imported 52 billion kWh
(see BFE, 2009). Thus, it would be more realistic to use an efficiency measure for an open
market, where imports and exports are used as an alternative to domestic production.
This is of interest for further study as well.
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